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INTRODUCTION

Amnesties are a well used and, in most circumstances, relatively
uncontroversial legal mechanism.' The institution of amnesty is found
throughout history and appears to have been used by every society of
which we have extensive knowledge. From medieval China to
contemporary South Africa, from the founding years of the United
States to contemporary Vietnam, amnesties have been used to fulfill a
variety of purposes. A quick review of amnesties across time periods,
societies, and cultures reveals that amnesties are as varied as the
societies and areas in which one finds them. From such disparate
disciplines as tax, immigration, and library science, amnesties have been
used to raise revenue, ratify settled expectations, and preserve book
collections, respectively. They have been used to express public grace
and forgiveness, and to further government corruption and oppression.
They have been used to bring law into compliance with an accepted
reality, and to exempt a contested reality from public scrutiny and moral
and legal accountability. They have been granted at times of great social
stability and at times of great social unrest; at the start of and during
wars for the purpose of recruiting troops, and at the end of wars to foster
peace and reconciliation.
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. From 1996 to 2001, I was a
consultant in international law to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
Needless to say, none of the views expressed in this article necessarily reflects those of the South
African TRC or any other organization. I would like to thank the following research assistants
who have provided invaluable help over the years: Davida Finger, Jinnah Rose-MacFadden, and
Sylvia Miller. I would also like to thank our international law librarian, Robert Menanteaux, for
invaluable research help and ideas, and Nora Santos for help with everything. For stimulating
conversation and ideas on the issues raised in this article, I would also like to thank Janet
Ainsworth, Jim Bond, Mark Chinen, Roger Clark, Sidney DeLong, Paul Dubinsky, Mark
Freeman, Duffy Graham, Paul Kahn, Jennifer Llewellyn, W. Michael Reisman, Mark Reutlinger,
Chris Roederer, Julie Shapiro, and Wilhelm Verwoerd. I would also like to thank the United
States Institute for Peace for providing invaluable financial and other assistance to a general
project on amnesties of which this is a part, and for their patience in seeing me through what has
become a much longer inquiry than initially proposed. Finally, I would like to thank the Seattle
University School of Law for additional financial and other support.
1. While individual amnesty proposals might be controversial, outside of the human rights
context discussed below there is very little controversy associated with the general principle of
amnesty.
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Most recently, and more controversially, amnesties have been used to
protect individuals from accountability for some of the worst human
rights atrocities in the history of humankind. Despite recent heightened
awareness of the problem, the protection of the powerful from the
judgment of the law is not unique to contemporary society. What makes
the use of amnesties today so troubling is not the failure to hold
accountable those individuals responsible for systematic violations (for
that has been the all too common reaction to such violations throughout
human history), but rather their increased use and acceptance in a world
which has universally embraced the idea of fundamental human rights
from which no derogation is permitted-in particular, the absolute right
to be free from torture, slavery, genocide, and other gross violations of
human rights.2 The increased use of amnesties is thus less a reflection of
our increased tolerance of impunity and more of an indicator of the
growing force of the international human rights movement and
international criminal law.
Historically, amnesties for war crimes and what we today call crimes
against humanity were less common precisely because there was little
acceptance of the notion that state officials could be held accountable
for such acts. It is not that amnesties are now being used in areas where
they have been unknown before, or in new or novel ways, but that a
consensus has emerged in the last fifty years that certain acts by official
actors are no longer beyond the reach of legal accountability. At the
same time, it is the growing legitimacy of institutions whose purpose is
to increase international accountability that makes amnesties so
important and valuable to violators.
Opponents of the use of amnesties have focused on international law,
primarily as reflected in multilateral treaties, General Assembly
resolutions, official United Nations reports and studies, customary
international law, and decisions by international and regional tribunals.
Not much attention has been paid to state practice, and even less to
general principles of law accepted by states.' This is in part attributable
2. The phrase "gross violations of human rights" has been used by a variety of people and

institutions to describe those core rights that are considered fundamental and not subject to
derogation. I will use gross violations of human rights to refer to those specific rights designated

as such in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, which identifies the following violations
as "gross violations," no matter how widespread or systematically they are committed: genocide;
slavery and slave trade; murder or disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; and systematic racial discrimination.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §702 cmt. m (1987).
3. General principles of law accepted by states is a recognized source of international law that
has rarely been used and even more rarely understood. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50-55 (1991).
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to the overwhelming state piactice of granting and enforcing amnesties.
This state practice makes it more difficult to prove a state consensus
around a general prohibition against such amnesties, thus raising the
perennial question with respect to state practice that is contrary to an
asserted principle of international law: does the contrary state practice
illustrate law violation or law reform? It is generally accepted that state
practice in and of itself does not constitute international law4 and those
who argue that such amnesties are prohibited point to such practice as
constituting a violation of, rather than a reflection of, international law.'
My purpose here is not to contribute to the more general debate
concerning the coherence of state practice and customary international
law as a source of international law.6 Instead, my purpose here is to
evaluate the legitimacy of amnesties in light of the major international
law arguments used to criticize amnesties, and in light of six specific
areas of law from which additional general principles to evaluate
amnesties may be derived. Four of these six areas of law are found
primarily in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and two are found in
international law. While I am trained in the Anglo-American legal
tradition, and thus most knowledgeable about this tradition, some of
these principles transcend any one legal tradition. I will thus, in a much
less systematic fashion, discuss some of these principles as reflected in
legal systems outside of the Anglo-American tradition, including the
system of international law.
In order to place these general principles in context, I first discuss in
Part II the major international law arguments made with respect to
amnesties for human rights violations. I break the international law
arguments into three schools: the obligation to prosecute school; the
fundamental rights of victims school; and the social stability school. I
derive from these three schools of argument four principles we can use
to evaluate the legitimacy of amnesties.
In Part III, I supplement this international law discussion with a
survey of six areas of law that reflect additional applicable policies and
principles applicable to amnesties. I then discuss whether each of these
principles can be used to inform an evaluation of the legitimacy of such
amnesties. I conclude that the principles underlying recognition and
enforcement of foreign official acts, and'the doctrine of non bis in idem,
are not a barrier to evaluating the legitimacy of foreign amnesties.
POWER:
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF
LAW, PREROGATIVES OF
4. But see
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOsOvO 37-65 (2001).
5. See infra note 24.
6. For recent and thoughtful discussions of customary international law as a source of law, see
generally the work of Jack Goldsmith, Eric Posner, Mark Chinen, and Michael Glennon.
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Further, the general acceptance of denying protection to persecutors
under international refugee law is far more controversial than the
proposal that persecutors be ineligible for amnesty and held accountable
for their acts. Extradition law suggests that while political acts of
violence may be entitled to special protection, the modem trend under
both extradition and international law is to deny protection to certain
heinous acts even if they are politically motivated. I next conclude that
the policies underlying immunities, statutes of limitation, and laches do
not provide an adequate justification for amnesties, and in fact, both
historic and modem trends argue for the exemption of certain gross
violations of human rights from the application of such doctrines.
Finally, while the general acceptance of pardons by most legal systems
might provide a justification for amnesties, a closer look at the
differences between amnesties and pardons, and the policies underlying
the latter, argue against a liberal acceptance of amnesties.
In conclusion, in Part IV, I briefly outline a typology of amnesties,
arguing that not all amnesties are alike. I divide amnesties into four
general categories: amnesic, compromise, corrective, and accountable.7
I further suggest that in light of the general principles of law and the
major international law arguments set forth in Parts II and III, we can
distinguish between just and unjust amnesties. I conclude that while a
just amnesty is conceptually possible, to date there is only one amnesty
that comes close to qualifying: the 1995 South African amnesty.
II.

AMNESTIES, INTERNATIONAL

LAW, AND STATE PRACTICE

International law and the domestic legal practice of states at times
permit, and even-in some cases-require, amnesties. International law
explicitly encourages the use of amnesties at the end of an armed
conflict, and such encouragement is codified in some of the
foundational documents of international humanitarian law.' Yet these
amnesties can, and should, be distinguished from amnesties for human
rights abuses.
One of the major innovations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was to
prohibit certain acts of violence even when committed as part of an
7. See infra notes 232-48 and accompanying text.
8. Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 6(5), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614
[hereinafter Protocol II] ("At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or
those deprived of their liberty for reasons relating to the armed conflict, whether they are interned
or detained.").
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armed conflict, and to enforce that prohibition through the institution of

universal jurisdiction. The Geneva Conventions were drafted at a time
when state compliance with the laws of armed conflict was low. The use
of the institution of universal jurisdiction to increase the pressure on

those engaged in armed conflict to comply with the laws of war would
be undercut if the encouragement of amnesty applied to such acts. There

is no evidence to suggest that the drafters of the Geneva Conventions
meant to take away with one hand what they had given with the other.9
A recent statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
authoritative interpretative body under the Geneva Conventions,
confirms that amnesties encouraged under Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 were meant to apply only to the granting of
amnesty to "those detained or punished for the mere fact of having
participated in hostilities. It does not aim at an amnesty for those having
violated international law."'
Properly understood, therefore, the amnesties encouraged under the
Geneva Conventions are amnesties for acts that violate national, but not

international, law. They permit a state to suspend accountability for
actions that do not rise to the level of an international law violation.
Such amnesties are not meant to apply to human rights violations; in
fact, they are designed and intended to further, rather than thwart,
human rights principles. They are what I will later refer to as "corrective
amnesties."" Amnesties for gross violations of human rights are easily
9. At best there is some ambiguity between the amnesty provisions of Protocol II and the
grave breaches provision of the Geneva Conventions reflected in the vote in support of the
amnesty provision (37 to 15, with 31 abstentions) and the failure of proposals explicitly to exempt
crimes against humanity from the purview of Article 6(5) amnesties. See Karen Gallagher, No
Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities ofAmnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 149, 177 n.196 (2000) (citing result of vote from Article 6(5)); id. at 177-78 (noting the
rejection by the negotiating parties of a Soviet proposal to make clear that the amnesty
encouraged in Article 6(5) was not to apply to crimes against humanity).
10. Margaret Popkin & Nehal Bhuta, Latin American Amnesties in Comparative Perspective:
Can the Past Be Buried?, 13 ETHICS & INTL. AFF. 99, 103 (1999) (citing letter to Margaret
Popkin from Toni Pfanner, Head of Legal Division, International Committee of the Red Cross
[hereinafter "ICRC"] Headquarters, Geneva, Apr. 5, 1997). The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights quotes a similar letter from the ICRC to the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia [hereinafter I.C.T.Y.] supporting this interpretation. The letter
states in relevant part:
The preparatory work for Article 6(5) indicates that the purpose of this precept is to
encourage amnesty,. . as a type of liberation at the end of hostilities for those who were
detained or punished merely for having participated in the hostilities. It does not seek to
be an amnesty for those who have violated international humanitarian law.
Parada Cea v. El Salvador, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1, OEA/ser. L./V./II.102, doc. 6 (1999); see also
Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing JurisprudenceofAmnesty, 20 HUM. RTS.
Q. 843, 863-66 (1998) (providing strong arguments for a narrow interpretation of Article 6(5)
based on text, intent, and policy).
11. See infra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
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distinguished from these internationally encouraged or required
amnesties. The acts for which the former amnesties apply are those that
international law has consistently condemned and for which the basis of
proscriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction has expanded over the last
five centuries.
Governments have used international law to hold individuals
accountable for their human rights violations for over 500 years. From
the first recorded international war crimes trial in 14742 to the ad hoc

criminal tribunals recently established for crimes committed in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ability of the powerful to act with
impunity has steadily diminished. The trend towards individual
accountability under international law accelerated at the end of the last
century with two developments. The first was the creation of the first
permanent court for investigating and prosecuting individuals accused
of committing the worst crimes known to humanity, and the second was
an increased willingness of states to invoke universal jurisdiction to
hold individuals accountable for gross violations of human rights.
Even as the international criminal justice system expands, states
continue to turn to amnesties as the mechanism of choice to address
systematic violations of human rights and to facilitate their own political
transitions after a period of state-sponsored terrorism. Amnesties of one
form or another have been used to limit the accountability of individuals
responsible for gross violations of human rights in every major political
transition in the twentieth century.
Despite the growing tension between the development of
international criminal laws and institutions on the one hand, and state
practice embracing amnesties on the other, there is surprisingly little
international law that directly addresses the legitimacy of amnesties.
There is little evidence of an international consensus among states-or
even among advocates and scholars-of the law that does or should
apply. There are a handful of state court decisions, 3 and even fewer
international decisions.' 4 Every international tribunal that has addressed
12. See ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR JUSTICE 12 (1998) (mentioning trial in 1474 of Peter van Hagenback for acts of rape, murder,
and pillage committed by troops under his command).
13. See infra notes 17-18.
14. Most of the
relevant international tribunal decisions are from the

Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights, but include a few from the Human Rights Committee under the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. See decisions cited infra at notes 69-70.

The fact that decisions concerning amnesty mostly come from the Inter-American system is not
surprising given that the most contentious amnesties to date have been granted in South America.
The trial chamber of the I.C.T.Y. has opined in dicta that an amnesty for torture would violate
international law and would not be accorded international legal recognition. Prosecutor v.

180

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 43:173

the issue has concluded that amnesties for gross violations of human
rights violate fundamental principles of international human rights
law; 5 however, with only a few exceptions, state courts that have
evaluated those same amnesties have reached the opposite conclusion
and upheld their legality. With one recent and notable exception, 6 in

every case in which a state judiciary has evaluated its own
government's amnesty for human rights violations, it has upheld the
amnesty.' 7 In those few cases in which a state court has evaluated
another state's amnesty for human rights violations, it has refused to
give the amnesty any legal effect.'

Assembly,

9

The United Nations General

the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),2" and the

Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T 155 (I.C.T.Y., Trial Chamber, Dec. 10, 1998), reprintedin
38 I.L.M. 317, 349 (1999).
15. See infra note 68.
16. The one exception involves the Argentinean laws that granted effective amnesty to those
responsible for gross violations of human rights during that country's dirty war. Judge Gabriel
Cavallo declared the Argentinean amnesty laws unconstitutional and invalid. See Resoluci6n del
Cavallo at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/ley/juezcavallo03mar.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2001).
In addition, a lower court in Chile ruled in 1995 that amnesty could not be granted for acts that
constitute war crimes under the Geneva Conventions. This ruling was short-lived, however, as the
Chilean Supreme Court quickly overturned it a few months later. See Derechos Chile, High Court
Amnesties Human Rights Case: Overturning Lower Court Ruling on Geneva Conventions, at
http://derechoschile.com/english/news/19960131.htm (Jan. 31, 1996).
17. See Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v. President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others, 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC) (South African Constitutional Court
upholding South African amnesty); ProceeedingsNo. 10-93 of the Supreme Court of El Salvador
on the Amnesty Law, reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 549-55 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (El Salvadoran Supreme Court
upholding Salvadoran amnesty).
18. Spanish courts investigating human rights abuses in Argentina and Chile have proceeded
despite the amnesties passed in both of those countries. For a brief discussion of these
prosecutions, see Richard J. Wilson, Spanish Criminal Prosecutions Use InternationalHuman
Rights Law to Battle Impunity in Chile and Argentina, KO'AGA ROIRE'ETA at
http://www.derechos.org/koaga/iii/5/wilson.html (Jan. 1997); see also Antoni Pigrau So16, The
Pinochet Case in Spain, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 653, 664 (noting that the Plenary of the
Criminal Section of the National Court in Spain held that the Chilean amnesty was contrary to
international law). For a dissenting opinion arguing that amnesty might be legitimately applied to
acts of torture, see Regina v. Bartle and the Comm'r of Police for the Metropolis and Others, ex
parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581, 605-06 (H.L. 1999) (opinion of Lord Goff of Chieveley)
("[T]orture may, for compelling political reasons, be the subject of an amnesty, or some other
form of settlement, in the state where it has been, or is alleged to have been, committed.").
While a United States court has never been confronted with the question of whether to give
effect to a foreign amnesty for human rights violations, at least in the immigration field U.S.
courts have been reluctant to allow a party to assert a foreign amnesty to pre-empt the court's
independent evaluation of the underlying act for which amnesty was granted. See, e.g., Marino v.
I.N.S., United States Dept. of Justice 537 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[F]oreign amnesties, like
foreign pardons, do not obliterate a foreign conviction or remove the disabilities that result from
such a 'conviction' for purposes of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Act.").
19. See, e.g., Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133
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Human Rights Committee" have all stated that amnesties violate
international law.22 International legal scholars differ on whether
amnesties are prohibited under international law. 23 Human rights
advocates generally oppose the use of amnesties for gross violations of
human rights.24
(1992) (stating that amnesty shall not be granted for the benefit of those responsible for the crime
of disappearance); G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 448, U.N. Doc.
A/9233 (1973);. G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29 at 444, U.N. Doc.
A/5892 (1971); G.A. Res. 2712, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 294, U.N. Doc. A/8233
(1970); G.A. Res. 2583, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30 at 266, U.N. Doc. A/7840 (1969).
20. E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, Annex, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, Principle 19.2 U.N.
Doc. E /1989/89 (1989) ("In no circumstances, including a state of war, siege, or other public
emergency, shall blanket immunity from prosecution be granted to any person allegedly involved
in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions.").
21. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, 47 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40, Annex
VI, general comment 20 at 195, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992) (stating that amnesties for torture are
generally incompatible with the obligations of states under international law).
22. The position of the UN on amnesties, however, is ambiguous. The UN-brokered peace
agreement in Sierra Leone includes a blanket amnesty, although the UN quickly distanced itself
from the amnesty provisions. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali implicitly
acknowledged the legitimacy of amnesties when he criticized the El Salvadoran amnesty, not
because of the impunity it provided, but because it was passed before a national consensus could
emerge supporting amnesty. See Report of the Secretary Generalon All Aspects of ONUSAL 's
Operations, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., addendum 3, annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25812 (1993) ("[I]t
would have been preferable if the amnesty had been promulgated after creating a broad degree of
national consensus in its favour."). See also infra note 33.
23. Compare Antonio F. Perez, The Perils ofPinochet: Problemsfor TransitionalJustice and
a Supranational Governance Solution, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175 (2000) (supporting
most amnesties and calling for a mechanism for creating an international binding amnesty) with
Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2585-93 (1991) (noting that customary international law imposes
an obligation to punish crimes against humanity). A recent collection of international law scholars
convened by Princeton Univeresity to establish principles for the assertion by states of universal
jurisdiction concluded that "[a]mnesties are generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to
provide accountability for serious crimes under international law .. " THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, PRINCIPLE 7 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) (emphasis
added).
24. Major international human rights organizations tend to oppose the use of amnesties for
gross violations of human rights. See Kenneth Roth, International Injustice: The Tragedy of
Sierra Leone, Wall St. J. (Europe), Aug. 2, 2000, available at http://www.hrw.org/editorials
/2000/ken-sl-aug.htm (executive director of Human Rights Watch calling Sierra Leonean amnesty
an "affront to international law"); Human Rights Watch, Peru: Amnesty Proposala 'Disasterfor
Human Rights," Oct. 26, 2000 at www.hrw.org/press/2000/10/montesinos 1025.htm (strongly
opposing Peruvian amnesty law); Amnesty International, Chile: Impunity in the Making-Justice
Defeated by Amnesty Law, Al Index: AMR 22/04/96, June 11, 1996 (indicating that 1978 Chilean
amnesty law contravenes international human rights standards); Amnesty International, El
Salvador: The Supreme Court Ruling is an Affront to Victims, Al Index AMR 29/005/2000, Oct.
5, 2000 (Salvadoran Supreme Court's holding that 1993 amnesty law is constitutional
"contradicts the underlying principles of human rights enshrined in international law"); Amnesty
International, Peru: Proposalto Legalize Impunity Even Furtheris Unacceptable, Al Index AMR
46/034/2000, Oct. 24, 2000 (noting that 1995 Peruvian amnesty law violates international law).
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Although international jurisprudence concerning amnesties is limited,
critics of amnesties for violations of human rights point to various
principles of international law and policy to argue that amnesties are
illegal. There are three major international law arguments made against
amnesties. First, it is argued that amnesties violate well-established
principles of international law that obligate a state to prosecute
individuals responsible for certain gross violations of human rights. I
call this the obligation to prosecute argument. Second, it is argued that
amnesties violate a victim's fundamental rights guaranteed under
international law. I call this the victim's rights argument. Third, it is
argued that amnesties undercut efforts to establish a stable democracy
that honors human rights and the rule of law. I call this the rule of law
argument. In contrast to these three arguments, states generally claim
that amnesties further peace, truth, and reconciliation. 5 The peace claim
will be addressed in the discussion of the rule of law argument; the truth
claim will be addressed in the discussion of the victim's rights
argument; and the reconciliation claim will be addressed in the
discussion of the obligation to prosecute argument.
A.

Amnesties, Accountability, and the Obligationto Prosecute
Argument

There is strong support for the argument that international law
imposes an absolute obligation on states to prosecute particular crimes.2 6
For example, international treaties prohibiting torture, genocide,28 war
Local human rights organizations are less consistent, some supporting and some opposing
amnesties for gross violations of human rights. Compare Corinna Schuler, A Wrenching Peace:
Sierra Leone's 'See No Evil' Pact, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 15, 1999 at 1, (noting that
200 representatives of Sierra Leonean civil society supported amnesty for combatants); with
Popkin & Bhuta, supra note 10 at 116 (finding that coalition of local non-governmental
organizations and relatives of victims lobbied against Guatemalan amnesty for military).
25. States cite to other justifications for amnesties-such as the fact that prosecutions would
be too expensive-but these are usually combined with one of the three other claims identified
above. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2544-49 (commenting on state justifications
for not prosecuting human rights violations).
26. Others have canvassed the applicable treaties and customary international law arguments
in more detail. For one of the earliest arguments concerning the obligation to prosecute, see
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights
Violations in InternationalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449 (1990); see also Orentlicher, supra note 23.
27. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art 5(2). G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987) art. 5(2), reprintedin 24 I.L.M. 535 (1984)
(establishing the jurisdiction of any state to prosecute torturers).
28. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. 227, 280-82 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (providing for international
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide).
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obligate

states to prosecute individuals

suspected of committing those crimes. There is substantial discussion in
opinions by the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human
Rights asserting some form of obligation to prosecute and punish under
international law.3 The United Nations has also indicated that states
have an obligation to prosecute those suspected of certain gross
violations of human rights,32 and has generally opposed the granting of
amnesty for gross violations of human rights.33 State practice in the area,
of course, does not live up to this high expectation, although this may be

due more to a failure of political will and the lack of effective
enforcement machinery at the international level than a belief that such
prosecutions are not required or desirable.
Arguments for an obligation to prosecute are based on the assumption

that prosecution tied to punishment is the best method in all
circumstances for achieving the legitimate goals of a criminal justice
system. In some, mostly civil, legal systems, the state is obligated to
prosecute an individual for whom there is evidence of criminal
wrongdoing. In such legal systems, there is little discretion with respect
29. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, arts. 146, 148, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3616-618, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386-88 (providing that states
may not absolve themselves from liability for grave breaches of the convention).
30. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 9, 1998, art.
8(1), 37 I.L.M. 249 (providing that if a state does not extradite an individual suspected of an
offense under the convention it is obliged "without exception whatsoever and whether or not the
offense was committed within its territory" to prosecute the suspect without undue delay).
31. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
32. See Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary or
Summary Executions, U.N. Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, U.N. Doc.
ST/CSDHA/12 (1991), quoted in Ellacuria v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136,
OEA/ser. L.N./II.106, doc. 6, rev. 3 (1999); see also Letter from the Security Council to the
Secretary General,U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (2000) (recommending, among
other things, that the draft agreement for the creation of an ad hoc international criminal court for
Sierra Leone include language stating that "it is the responsibility of Member States who have
sent peacekeepers to Sierra Leone to investigate and prosecute any crimes they may have
committed") (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) ("the United Nations has
consistently maintained the position that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international
crimes.... ") But the UN clearly does not take the position that amnesties are illegal in all cases.
In the same report concerning the special tribunal for Sierra Leone, the Secretary General noted
that the amnesty included in the earlier Lom6 Accord is to be denied legal effect "to the extent of
its illegality under international law ... " Id. at 5. The UN has not, however, consistently opposed
the use of amnesties for gross violations of human rights. The UN, effectively acting on behalf of
the U.S., insisted on the use of an amnesty in Haiti to protect members of the military from
prosecution in return for restoring the democratically elected President, Jean Bertrand Aristide, to
office. See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was there a Duty to Prosecute
InternationalCrimes in Haiti?,31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 6-8 (1996).
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to prosecution, although there may be discretion with respect to
punishment.34 The absolutist claim of an obligation to prosecute is hard
to defend in the face of competing and compelling societal interests that
may conflict with a general policy of punishment-interests that are
particularly important to a society undergoing a major transition.35
An obligation to prosecute in its purest form would not allow the
exercise of any discretion on the part of prosecutorial authorities. Such
an absolute obligation to prosecute not only poses challenges to a world
with limited prosecutorial resources, but also may interfere with the
legitimate goals of a criminal justice system. There are thus two major
concerns raised by such an obligation. First, limited prosecutorial
resources require strategic choices concerning what crimes to pursue
and what defendants to prosecute. An absolute obligation to prosecute
would not allow such strategic decision-making, and thus might result
in a less efficient criminal justice system. The determination of the
effectiveness in the U.S. of a criminal justice system with broad
prosecutorial discretion, and the regulation of the use of such discretion,
is made by local communities who elect prosecutors and, in many
states, judges.36 Second, prosecution may undercut, or at least fail to
advance, some legitimate goals of a criminal justice system. An absolute
obligation to prosecute would exclude the use of other non-prosecutorial
means to further the legitimate goals of a criminal justice system.
1.

The Reality ofLimited ProsecutorialResources

First, concerning limited prosecutorial resources, there is little
discussion in the emerging jurisprudence of amnesties in international
law concerning the weight, if any, to be given to a state's limited
resources. All of the challenges to amnesties brought before the InterAmerican Commission and Court have concerned cases where there is
strong evidence that the state deliberately refused to prosecute
individuals suspected of gross violations of human rights in order to
shield the latter from accountability.3 7 In none of these cases does the
34. See, e.g., COD. PROC. PEN. art. 431 (Argentina) (giving prosecutor in some cases
discretion with respect to punishment); see also Mark Osiel, Making Public Memory, Publicly, in
HUMAN RIGHTS INPOLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 217, 231, n. 29 (Carla

Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999) (Argentinean law has been interpreted to obligate the state to
indict individuals for whom there is sufficient evidence to suggest wrongdoing).
35. See Carlos Nino, The Duty to Punish PastAbuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The
Case ofArgentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619 (1991).
36. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding ProsecutorialDiscretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative CriminalProcedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325,

1343-44 (1993).
37. See, e.g., Ellacuria, 10.488 Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136,

sham legal proceedings in connection with murder of civilians).

122-42 (concerning cover up and
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Commission or Court address in any meaningful way the question of
prosecutorial discretion. This is not surprising since the states involved
in these cases either cursorily respond, if at all, to the allegations (thus
giving rise to the equivalent of a default judgment)," or do not raise the
question of limited resources and higher prosecutorial priorities.3 9 More
importantly, many of these cases involve situations where the state's
complicity in the crimes at issue is pervasive, making a defense based
on discretion less persuasive.

Yet prosecutorial discretion can, and in some societies does, provide
an important mechanism for a state to balance competing legitimate
interests. Prosecutors may use their discretion to forego a particular
prosecution in order to elicit evidence and useful testimony from codefendants, or to direct more efficiently limited resources. Eliciting
evidence and useful testimony is made possible through plea bargaining
and other similar agreements entered into between prosecutors and

defendants.40 Such arrangements allow more lenient treatment in return
for "truth,"'" a dynamic similar to that created by the South African
amnesty.42 There is, however, very little international law concerning
the appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion.43
Allowing prosecutors to allocate limited prosecutorial resources may

provide a greater overall social benefit than would otherwise be
obtained if prosecutors were not given discretion to set priorities. For
example, a domestic prosecutor may focus on a particular class of

crimes (such as drug-related crimes, or crimes committed with
weapons) or a particular class of defendants (such as members of a
particular drug cartel, or all drug suppliers) with the belief that such
prosecutions will more effectively diminish a prominent social ill. A
38. See Romero v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37, OEA/ser. L/V.II.106,
5-8 (noting the State of El Salvador's multiple failures to respond at all to the petition).
39. However, in at least one of its opinions the Inter-American Commission suggests that the
duty to investigate may vary according to a state's resources. See id., 1 143 (noting the state's
obligation to "investigate with the means at its disposal the violations committed within its
jurisdiction" (emphasis added)).
40. In addition to plea bargaining, a prosecutor may exercise discretion by choosing to indict
for a "lesser offense" covered by the same facts. See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524-32 (1981).
41. The quality of the truth elicited from plea bargaining has been questioned in the U.S., one
prominent court going so far as to equate plea bargaining with bribery. See United States v.
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'den banc 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
42. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
43. One notable exception is the International Law Commission's 1996 Draft Code of
Crimes, which prohibits the use of prosecutorial discretion to grant immunity from prosecution
for any crime in the Code in return for cooperative testimony, although such cooperation may be
used to lessen the cooperator's punishment. Report of the International Law Commission ,U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
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decision not to prosecute a particular individual may be made in return
for that individual's testimony, in response to a plea bargain that allows
some punishment without the cost and risk of a trial, or because the
limited resources available may be directed more beneficially at
prosecuting other defendants. Decisions not to prosecute may thus lead
to increased truth (when used to obtain accomplice testimony),
accountability (when used to obtain a plea), and efficiency (when used
to direct limited resources towards other more important social ills).
2.

The Legitimate Goals of a CriminalJustice System

Second, an absolute obligation to prosecute might prevent or hinder
the reconciliation and rehabilitation goals of a criminal justice system.
Many states' and commentators" claim that amnesty furthers
reconciliation in a deeply divided society. Statements by some victims
provide anecdotal support for this assertion.46 In thinking about the role
of amnesty in achieving these goals, it is useful to distinguish between
three functions of the traditional prosecutorial model: investigation;
adjudication; and punishment. Investigation is the process by which
facts are assembled, and assessments of truth and responsibility are first
made. Adjudication is the process by which we test our level of
certainty concerning the responsibility of a particular individual or
organization. Punishment is our response to the individual whom we
have determined is responsible for the violations in question; that is,
punishment is the means by which we hold a responsible party to
account. It is useful to separate out these three functions in order to
44. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 33, at 15-6 (commenting on the use of amnesty in Haiti and
noting that amnesty is "likely to reconcile the nation with itself by covering it with a lawful shield

of oblivion to general political events that disrupted the life of the nation"); see also the postamble to the South African Interim Constitution of 1993. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. ch. 16 (1993)
(tying amnesty with the goal of reconciliation and building a bridge to a better future).
45. See, e.g., DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 257-82 (1999)
(forgiveness is necessary for true reconciliation); Adam Michnik, Why Deal with the Past, in
DEALING WITH THE PAST: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 15-18 (Alex Boraine

et al. eds., 1994) (reconciliation is first priority, and mutual amnesty opens the road to peace); see
also Carla Hesse & Robert Post, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS,
supra note 34, at 13, 20-21 (amnesty as sometimes necessary to reconciliation); Juan E. M6ndez,
In Defense of TransitionalJustice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 1, 7 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) (referring to advocates who recommend that
a "thick line" be drawn to divide the past from the present).
46. See Gallagher, supra note 9, at 165 n. 131 (quoting victims of atrocities committed by
rebels in Sierra Leone to the effect that amnesty is a price they are willing to pay for peace and

reconciliation). This is obviously not a view held by all victims. See id. at 190 n.269 (noting that
women who were abducted and raped were adamant that rebels should be prosecuted for gross
violations of human rights); see also Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v.
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 1996 SALR 671 (CC) (victims of human
rights abuses in South Africa challenging legality of 1995 South African amnesty).
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highlight the separate goals of truth, responsibility, and accountability.47
Truth, knowledge, and acknowledgment are justice goals clearly
articulated in international law, and constitute some of the basic goals of
a criminal trial. Linked to this truth function is the goal of individual
accountability. Truth allows, and in fact provides, a minimal form of
accountability through the public identification of responsibility.48
Punishment is often conflated with accountability (certainly most of the
international law on the subject speaks more of punishment than of
accountability). A growing body of scholarship, coupled with state
preferences for truth commissions over trials during a period of
transition, has begun to seriously address the relationship between
punishment and accountability. 9 Proponents of this "restorative justice"
school argue that the prosecutorial or retributive model of criminal
justice does not advance, and in many cases may hinder, the important
societal interest in a stable and just social order." In particular,
proponents of restorative justice argue for the need to focus more
explicitly on restoring the relationships among victims, perpetrators, and
society. Although states often defend their blanket amnesties by
claiming that their purpose is to foster reconciliation,5' proponents of
restorative justice do not support such blanket amnesties. 2
The challenge of restorative justice, then, is the focus on methods of
accountability that de-emphasize punishment. International law,
however, appears to conflate accountability with punishment, and at
least as reflected in major treaties and decisions, leaves less room for
alternative models inspired by restorative justice. Both international
47. The functions of investigation and adjudication are separated in the German civil law
system. See John H. Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 448-49 (1974). As an analytical starting point, Ruti Teitel divides the criminal justice
system into two primary functions-prosecution and punishment. See Ruti Teitel, From
Dictatorship to Democracy: The Role of TransitionalJustice, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 272 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999).
48. I argue this in slightly more detail in Ronald C. Slye, Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation:
Reflections on the South African Amnesty Process, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS 170, 171-77 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thomspon, eds., 2000).
49. See RUTI G. TEITEL, T RANSNATIONAL JUSTICE (2000); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE
(2000); Jennifer Llewelyn and Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49:3 U. TORONTO L.J. 355 (1999).
50. Llewelyn and Howse, supra note 49.
Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37, OEA/ser.
51. See, e.g., Romero v. El Salvador,
LV./II. 106, 20 (noting state's claim that Peace Accord was designed to stabilize the country
and promote reconciliation).
52. See Jennifer Llewelyn, Just Amnesty and Private International Law in TORTURE AS
TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LITIGATION 567, 577-78 (Craig Scott ed. 2001).
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treaties as well as the increasing number of decisions concerning state
obligations with respect to gross violations of human rights not only
speak of obligations to investigate and prosecute, but also to punish.53
For example the Genocide Convention states that "Persons committing
genocide... shall be punished... ."' Decisions of the Inter-American
Commission and Court note the importance of punishment in some
cases, and even suggest that punishment is required.5 In fact, decisions

of the Inter-American Commission and Court are more accurately cited
in support of the more specific obligation to punish, rather than the
more general obligation to prosecute. 6 Resolutions of the UN General
Assembly speak of an obligation both to prosecute and punish."
International humanitarian law imposes a duty on military and civilian
superiors to punish subordinates involved in a war crime. 8 The failure
of a superior to punish a subordinate makes that superior criminally
53. Although the obligation to punish appears to have strong support in international law,
what constitutes a sufficient punishment for gross violations of human rights under international
law has not been the subject of much international law-making. The ad hoc international criminal
tribunals in the Hague are an important exception, as they have recently begun to address the
question of adequate and appropriate punishment. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No.
IT-96-22-A (I.C.T.Y., Appeals Chamber, Oct. 7, 1997) (discussing appropriate sentences for war
crimes and crimes against humanity).
54. Genocide Convention, supra note 28, at art. IV.
55. See Barrios Altos Case (Chimbipuma Aguierre v. Peru) Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 75,
41 I.L.M. 93, 118 13 (2002) (Ramirez, Sergio Garcia, J., concurring) (noting that "certain very
serious human rights violations must be punished surely and effectively at the national and
international level."); Lincoleo v. Chile, Case 11.711, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser.
L.V./II. 111, doc. 20 (2001), 7 55, 79 (noting that the American Convention imposes on states
the obligation to punish the guilty); see also Velasquez-Rodriguez Case Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C)
no. 4 (1988),
166. ("States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights
recognized by the Convention.. : .") (emphasis added); Masacre Las Hojas v. El Salvador, Case
10.287, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 26, OEA/ser. L.N./II.83, doc. 14 (1993), 5(a) (state is obligated to
submit those identified as responsible for gross violations of human rights "to justice in order to
establish their responsibility so that they receive the sanctions demanded by such serious
actions") (emphasis added)).
56. The Inter-American Commission has repeatedly taken the position that the prosecution
and punishment of those guilty of violations of the American Convention is the "most effective"
method of ensuring and protecting the Convention's rights. See Lincoleo, Case 11.771, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 136 at 49; Ellacuria v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136, OEA/ser.
L.N./II.106, doc. 6 (1999), 200; Romero, Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37 at 126.
57. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 79, U:N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974),
1. ("War crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they are committed,
shall be subject to. investigation and the persons against whom there is evidence that they have
committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and, if found guilty, punishment.")
58. See Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions reprinted in Diplomatic Conference on
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflict, Protocols I & II to the Geneva Conventions, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 6, Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of itsforty-eighth session, at 34-39, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No.
10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 ILC Draft Code].
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liable; that is, the failure to "prosecute" becomes a criminal act for
which the superior officer may be held responsible." The final report of
the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission notes the importance
of the state exercising its full "power to punish" in furthering
reconciliation and the rule of law.6"
There are thus strong international legal arguments supporting an
obligation for a state to investigate, prosecute, and punish those
responsible for gross violations of human rights. Given the different
purposes behind each of the three criminal justice functions (truth,
responsibility, and accountability), it is not clear that the international
law focus on prosecution and punishment is adequate to achieve all that
we expect from a criminal justice system. Instead, a requirement that a
state not be precluded from prosecuting and, if appropriate, punishing,
may provide a minimal standard that avoids the danger of the "one size
fits all" solution of mandatory prosecution and punishment and the
opposite danger of perpetual impunity. Such a minimum standard might
take the form of a prohibition against amnesties, leaving the decision to
forego criminal prosecution to the prosecutor. Such a solution may
result in the postponement of prosecution in particular cases because of
limited resources or concerns about social stability, but allow such
actions later, particularly with the worst crimes that are not subject to a
statute of limitations.
Acceptance of prosecutorial discretion, motivated by either limited
resources or strategic decisions, does not, of course, preclude a
prohibition against amnesty. While we might acknowledge that a state
has some discretion in determining who should be prosecuted, given
limited resources or other societal goals we could still assert that a state
does not have the power to shield an individual from present or future
accountability through a grant of amnesty. In other words, we might
conclude that a state should not be required to prosecute all individuals
suspected of committing gross violations of human rights, but that a
59. See 1996 ILC Draft Code at cmt. 4; see also Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [hereinafter LC.T.Y. statute]

S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for the

Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States

[hereinafter I.C.T.R. statute] S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 4353d mtg., Annex, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
60. Report of the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, February 1991, vol. 2, p.
868, quoted in Lincoleo, Case 11.771, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61 at 83.

190

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 43:173

state should not be permitted to use an amnesty affirmatively to protect
an individual from future prosecution or other forms of accountability.
This appears to be the position of the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, which has held that the mere existence of a general
blanket amnesty violates a state's obligations under the American
Convention.61 Support can also be found for this position in the statutes
of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the Hague. In effect, the
two tribunal statutes establish that a state may not protect someone from
international accountability by pretending to try and punish them
domestically. Specifically, these conventions provide that the tribunals
may have jurisdiction over a suspect after a state has prosecuted him if
the domestic prosecution was based on a lesser offense, was heard
before a partial tribunal, or was designed to protect the suspect from
international accountability.62
While the statutes of the international criminal courts do not directly
address the issue of amnesties, it would be odd if the tribunals would
allow a state to do through an amnesty what it could not do with a trial.
The concurrent jurisdiction language, however, is consistent with some
recognition of amnesties by such international tribunals. The provisions
regarding non-recognizable domestic prosecutions concern sham
prosecutions-prosecutions that are undertaken primarily for the purpose
of protecting an individual from full accountability. A prosecution that
results in a lenient sentence is not necessarily one that runs afoul of the
sham prosecution provisions, so long as it is clear that the lenient
sentence was not the result of a deliberate policy of shielding that
individual from accountability.63 True accountability does not always
require a harsh sentence. Applying the sham prosecution principle to
61. This violation occurs in addition to the violations of the right to know and the right to
justice that occur through the application of the amnesty law to a particular case. See Romero,
Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37 at 136 (general amnesty violates state's obligation "to refrain
from adopting laws that do away with, restrict, or render null and void the rights and freedoms, or
the effectiveness thereof, set forth in the American Convention"); Lincoleo, Case 11.771, InterAm. C.H.R. 61 at 47 (adoption of Chilean amnesty violates Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American
Convention, which obligate a state to pass legislation to give effect to the rights protected by the
Convention); Ellacuria, Case 10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136 at 239 (same for El Salvadoran
amnesty).
62. See I.C.T.Y. statute, supra note 59, at art. 10; I.C.T.R. statute, supra note 59, at art. 9(2).
In commentary to its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes, although not reflected in the actual text of
the Draft Code, the ILC includes in its discussion of suspect activity the imposition of a penalty
not commensurate with the crime at issue. ILC Draft Code, art. 12, cmt. 2, p. 67. Implied in this
penalty evaluation is the principle that specific crimes have a definite range of penalties
associated with them, and thus that there are penalties that are inappropriately weak. Amnesties
for certain crimes may thus run afoul of such a principle.
63. It is not yet clear what criteria will be used to interpret the principle of complementarity,
and thus how deferential the International Criminal Court [hereinafter I.C.C.] will be to national
claims of domestic accountability.
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amnesties, what I call an "amnesic amnesty,"'6 should not remove the
jurisdiction of an international tribunal, whereas what I call an
"accountable amnesty" might65
Although there is strong textual evidence in international law
imposing a duty on states to prosecute and punish gross violations of
human rights, the content or interpretation of that obligation is not clear.
State practice and the emerging jurisprudence of restorative justice
challenge the assertion that the goals of a criminal justice system are
always well served with a retributive justice model. If existing
international law is vague about the specifics of a state's obligation to
prosecute or punish, there is clearly some obligation under international
law to hold accountable those individuals who are responsible for gross
violations of human rights. Proponents of restorative justice remind us
that accountability does not necessarily require prosecution and
punishment, but may be satisfied by other means. Thus, to the extent
that amnesties foreclose any form of accountability for gross violations
of human rights, they violate the general principle of international law
that requires some response to such atrocities. An obligation to provide
accountability is most evident with respect to the most serious
international crimes, for it is with respect to those crimes that
international treaties and decisions explicitly require prosecution and
punishment.
B.

Amnesties and the FundamentalRights of Victims

Proponents of the second major argument against amnesties point to
the decisions of numerous international tribunals that declare amnesties
violative of a victim's fundamental rights under international law.
International tribunals that have addressed the legitimacy of
amnesties-primarily the Inter-American Commission and Court of
Human Rights-have identified five principles that amnesties violate: the
right to justice;66 the right to truth, oftentimes referred to as an

obligation to investigate; 67 the right to judicial protection, 68 also referred
64. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
66. See American Convention on Human Rights, Articles 1(1) and 2, as interpreted by the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am.
59-61; see also Ellacuria,Case
C.H.R. 36, OEA/ser. L./V./Il.95, doc. 7, rev. at 156 (1997),
10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136 at T 198 (Amnesty laws "leave the victims of serious human rights
violations unprotected, since they deprive them of the right to seek justice.").
67. See infra note 74.
68, See American Convention on Human Rights, Article 25, as interpreted by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights in Consuelo v. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181,
10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 28, OEA/ser. L/V./II.83, doc. 14 at 41 (1993),
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to as the right to an effective remedy;69 and the right to judicial
guarantees, also referred to as the right to a fair trial or hearing.7"
Central to the effectiveness of a right is a mechanism by which that
right can be recognized, protected, and vindicated. These five principles
all concern a state's obligation to ascertain and protect an individual's
rights-in particular, the obligation to provide some remedy if a
violation has occurred. They are thus often discussed in connection with
the more general obligation of a state to ensure the effective enjoyment

and protection of fundamental human rights.
1.

The Right to Justice'

Among the five principles that amnesties are said to violate, the most
general is the right to justice. The other four principles all derive from
this right. The right to justice has been interpreted to include the

following: the right to an investigation that identifies those responsible
for the violation; the right to prosecution of those identified as
responsible; the right to punishment of those responsible; and the right
to compensation for the wrong suffered.7 Justice Richard Goldstone,

the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has said that "full justice" consists
of the "trial of the, perpetrator and, if found guilty, adequate
punishment."" Similarly, the Inter-American Commission has stated
38-39; Mendoza v. Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374,
and 10.375, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 29, OEA/ser. LN./Il.83, doc. 14 at 154 (1993), 1 47-49;
Hermosilla,Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 36 at 1 68-72.
69. See Romero v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37, OEA/ser. LN./II.106,
74 (interpreting Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights to require that state's
provide "effective judicial remedies to victims of human rights violations"); Parada Cea v. El
Salvador, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1, OEA/ser. L./V./II.102, doc. 6 (1999), 125; see also Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, regarding Article 7 (44th Sess.), U.N.
Doc. HRI\GEN\I\Rev.1 at 30 (1994); Lewenhoff v. Uruguay, UN Hum. Rts. Comm. No.
30/1978, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985) (right to a remedy obligates state to investigate and
prosecute).
70. American Convention on Human Rights, Articles 1(1) and 8(1), as interpreted by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Barios Altos, supra note 55, 1 42; Consuelo,
Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311 Inter-Am. C.H.R. 28 at In 32-37; Mendoza
v. Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374 and 10.375, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 29, OEA/ser. LN./II.83 at 1 35-46; Hermosilla, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 36 at 1
62-67 (in reference to art. 8(1)).
71. Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am C.H.R. 133, OEA/ser. LN./II.106, doc. 6
(1999),
75 (right to justice includes "rendering justice in the specific case, punishing those
responsible, and providing adequate reparations to the family members"); see also Velasquez
Rodriguez, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (1988), 174.
72. Judge Richard J. Goldstone, Foreword to MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS ix (Beacon Press 1998).
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that an amnesty that shields an individual from criminal liability violates

the right to justice of the victim, as it prevents the state from fulfilling
its obligation to investigate and take "punitive action."73 The right of a
victim to have her perpetrator prosecuted or punished is the corollary to
the state's obligation to prosecute and punish discussed above.

2.

The Right to Truth

The state's obligation to investigate, also referred to as the victim's
and society's right to "truth," is the clearest and most widely accepted

right that is implicated by most amnesties.74 States have paradoxically
justified amnesties as legitimate vehicles for blocking truth and for
enhancing truth. In commenting on his country's amnesty, for example,
the President of El Salvador emphasized that amnesty is important for

"erasing, eliminating, and forgetting the past in its entirety."75 The name
amnesty, in fact, comes from the same Greek root as amnesia, and is
often equated with forgetting or ignoring the past. None of the

amnesties that have been the subject of international adjudication
incorporate any form of investigation or truth telling,76 although some
73. Espinoza, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 133 at
82, 155 (amnesty violates victim's
right to justice by preventing the identification of perpetrators, establishing their responsibility,
imposing the corresponding punishment, and providing judicial reparations); Hermosilla, Case
10:843, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 36 at 9 111.
74. See, e.g., Barios Altos, supra note 55, 42; Lincoleo v. Chile, Case 11.711, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser. L.N./II.1 11, doc. 20 (2001),
62 (noting that a State may not renounce its
obligation to investigate a public crime); Ellacuria v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
136, OEA/ser. L.N./II.106, doc. 6 (1999), 223 ("the right to know the truth arises as a basic and
indispensable consequence for every State party to [the American Convention]....") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Romero v. El Salvador,
144 ("The right to the truth is a collective
right that enables society to have access to information essential to the development of
democracies"); see also Yasa v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 63/1997/847/1054, 100, reprinted in
20 HUM. RTS. L.J. 24, 34 (1999) (finding the obligation of a state under the European Convention
on Human Rights to carry out an effective investigation after learning of murder).
75. Parada Cea y Otros v. El Salvador, Case 10.480, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1, OEA/ser.
L./V./II.102, doc. 6 (1999), 5.
76. Some amnesties, because of their limited application, are often accompanied by judicial
or other governmental determinations that may provide some form of investigation. The
Honduran Supreme Court, for example, interpreted the Honduran amnesty language to. require
that a criminal court judge investigate allegations of military involvement in human rights abuses
before ruling whether the defendants were entitled to amnesty. Vladimir Recinos, Honduran
Supreme Court Rules Against Military Officers' Petition, F.B.I.S. LAT 96-015 (Jan. 23, 1996);
see Honduras, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Recurso de Amparo en Revision, No. 60-96, case
Hernandez Santos y otros (Tegucigalpa Jan. 18, 1996).
The Guatemalan amnesty is administered by the judiciary. See Popkin & Bhuta, supra note 10
at 116. Cases that may fall under the amnesty law are transferred to a special appeals chamber
where an expedited procedure is used to determine if the amnesty applies. Margaret Popkin,
Guatemala's National Reconciliation Law: Combating Impunity or Continuing It? 24 REVISTA
IIDH173 (1996).
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have been accompanied by other investigatory processes, such as a truth
commission.77 Amnesties passed in Honduras and Guatemala were
designed to hide the truth, but have been interpreted by their state's
courts to require that the investigative phase of a prosecution be
completed before the determination of whether or not an amnesty may
be granted.78 President Alwyn of Chile similarly interpreted the amnesic
1978 Chilean amnesty to require a full judicial investigation before it
could be applied. 79 The Chilean courts have varied in their adherence to
this interpretation known as the "Alwyn Doctrine. 80
States have also justified their enactment of amnesties as a vehicle to
enhance truth. Such a claim is based either on the type of amnesty used,
or the combination of an otherwise amnesic amnesty with a truth
commission. The claim to a truth-enhancing amnesty is strongest in the
case of the 1995 South African amnesty (and to some extent with the
Honduran and Guatemalan amnesties as interpreted by their respective
state's courts). The South African amnesty provides the strongest claim
since it creates a direct correspondence between grants of amnesty and
the revelation of truth. An individual must come forward and reveal
information about those human rights violations of which she was a
part. Without such revelations, a perpetrator will not receive amnesty,
and thus may be subject to either civil or criminal accountability.8 In
those countries in which the courts have interpreted an amnesty to
require some amount of fact finding when raised as a defense to a claim
(such as Honduras and Guatemala), the truth telling will only take place
if an amnesty is challenged by the filing of a prosecution or civil claim.
Thus, in the latter case, an individual might be granted amnesty and
never have to reveal anything about her past.
States sometimes combine amnesties with a truth commission in
A Presidential decree creating an amnesty in the Philippines provided for subsequent decrees
in which the names of eligible individuals are listed after consultation with an amnesty
commission. Study on Amnesty Laws and Their Role in the Safeguard and Promotion of Human
Rights, Preliminary Report by Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16 (1985).
77. See examples of Chile, Argentina, and El Salvador.
78. See supra note 76.
79. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS 98 (Routledge 2001).

80. Id. at 98, n. 29; see also supra note 16.

81. The South African

constitutional court, in declaring its country's amnesty legitimate

against a constitutional and international law challenge, found it significant that the amnesty
affirmatively contributed to the search for truth. Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and
Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 1996 SALR 671 (CC). As John
Dugard has rightly noted, the Constitutional Court in Azapo did not adequately address the
international law issues raised by the amnesty. John Dugard, Is the Truth and Reconciliation
Process Compatible with InternationalLaw? An Unanswered Question, 13 S.AFR. J. HUM. RTS.
258, 266-67 (1997).
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order to compensate for the failure of most amnesties to address the
right to truth. States defend such amnesties by arguing that the ability to
increase truth through a commission is dependent on a peaceful change
of government, which is in turn dependent on enacting a general
amnesty. This argument has been rejected by the few international
tribunals that have addressed it. The Inter-American Commission, for
example, has stated that the quality of truth that comes from a trial is to
be preferred to that derived from a truth commission," and that a truth
commission combined with an amnesty does not fulfill the obligations
of the state under the American Convention. 3
3.

The Right to JudicialProtection

By precluding access to normal civil and criminal judicial
procedures, amnesties also have been found to violate the right to
judicial protection, also referred to as the right 'to an effective remedy. 4
The right to adequate reparations as a remedy (which as noted above is
also a part of the right to justice) is fundamental to any fulfillment of the
more general right to justice." Reparations most often come in the form
82. See the Ellacuria case, in which the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated:
The IACHR considers that, despite the important contribution that the [El Salvadoran]
Truth Commission made in establishing the facts surrounding the most serious
violations, and in promoting national reconciliation, the role that it played, although
highly relevant, cannot be considered as a suitable substitute for proper judicial
proceduresas a methodfor arriving at the truth.
Ellacuria v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136, OEA/ser. L./V./II.106, doc. 6
(1999), $ 229 (emphasis added); see also Romero v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
37, OEA/ser. L/V.IL.106,
146; Parada Cea y Otros v. El Salvador, Case 10.480, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 1,OEA/ser. L.N./II.102, doc. 6 (1999), 146.
83. See Lincoleo, Case 11.711, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser. L./V./Il.I 11, doc. 20 (2001),
ch. 6 (truth commission is inadequate when combined with an amnesty that precludes
investigation of criminal acts committed by the state, identification and publication of those
responsible, and punishment of those responsible.); Espinoza v. Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. 133, OEA/ser. L/V./II.106, doc. 6 (1999),
102 (truth commission combined with
amnesty violated rights of victims "to know the true facts."). Even if a state fulfills its obligations
concerning truth this is not enough to meet all of its obligations under the American Convention.
See Romero, Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37 at T 144 ("Nonetheless, the state's obligation to
guarantee the Right to Truth does not replace nor is it an alternative to all other obligations it has
in the context of its duty to guarantee, to wit, the duty to investigate and impart justice.") (quoting
with approval from amicus brief of Amnesty International).
84. The fight to judicial protection and the right to remedy are often discussed together. See
ParadaCea, Case 10.480, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1 at TT 124-29 (discussing right to effective remedy
and judicial protection in the context of El Salvadoran amnesty); see also Espinoza, Case 11.725,
Inter-Am C.H.R. 133 at 79 ("amnesties.. cannot deprive victims [of].. .the right to obtain, at a
minimum, adequate reparations for human rights violations enshrined [sic] in the American
Convention").
85. See The Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, Report by
Louis Joinet, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (1997), principle 33 ("Any human rights
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of compensation, but may also take the form of truth16 (that is letting the
truth be known), accountability, 7 or punishment. 8 Punishment as a

form of reparations is tied to the more retributive justifications for penal
law: the idea that a victim and society derive some benefit from the

knowledge that a wrongdoer is not only identified but also punished for
his crime.
4.

The Right to Reparations

The right to compensatory reparations is especially violated by an
amnesty that protects an individual from civil liability, and thus access
to damages provided by a civil judgment. The right to reparations may
also be violated by an amnesty that only provides protection against

criminal liability. The Inter-American Commission has found that
amnesties that bar criminal prosecutions may infringe the right to
reparations in those countries where the information gleaned from
criminal proceedings would be crucial for bringing a civil claim.89
violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim or his or her
beneficiaries...."); see also Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence under InternationalLaw:
Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 602-03 (1997) (duty of state to provide
reparations to victims of human rights violations).
86. The Inter-American
Commission has stated that truth can itself be a form of
compensation, although not finding that truth is itself sufficient to satisfy the right to judicial
protection. See, e.g., Ellacuria,Case 10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136 at 224; Romero, Case
11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37 at 148; ParadaCea, Case 10.480, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1 at 155
("The right possessed by all persons.. of knowing the full, complete, and public truth on incidents
which. have occurred, their specific circumstances, and who participated in them, are part of the
right to reparation for violations of human rights.") Truth is also a pre-requisite for reparations,
for without strong evidence remedial mechanisms are less likely to be effective. Id. at 152.
87. The "primary, substantial, and essential reparation" sought by the petitioners in Espinoza
was the holding to account of those responsible by the lifting of the amnesty rather than any
monetary compensation. Espinoza, Case 11.725, Inter-Am C.H.R. 133 at
153. The InterAmerican Court has interpreted the American Convention as imposing on a state the duty to
investigate and prosecute a case of disappearance and death, as well as the right of the victim and
his relatives "to have the relevant punishment, where appropriate, meted out...." Blake v.
Guatemala Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 36 (1998), reprinted in 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 393,
405 (1998) (interpreting Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights).
88. The Inter-American Commission and Court have tied the punishment of an offender to the
right of a victim to have access to the legal system for the vindication of his rights. See Blake v.
Guatemala, reprinted in 19 HUM. RTS. L.J., supra note 87 at 97 (the right to a trial for the
determination of human rights enshrined in Article 8(1) includes the right to a prosecution and the
right "to have the relevant punishment, where appropriate, meted out"); Ellacuria, Case 10.488,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136 at 195 (the right to an effective recourse for protection of fundamental
fights enshrined in Article 25 obligates a state to prosecute those responsible for a crime, to
"apply to them the corresponding legal penalties," and to pursue the prosecution to its "ultimate
conclusion").
89. See Espinoza, Case 11.725, Inter-Am C.H.R. 133 at 84 ("the manner in which the
amnesty was applied by the courts affected the right to obtain reparations within the civil courts,
given the impossibility of individualizing or identifying those responsible for the disappearance,
torture, and extrajudicial execution of Carmelo Soria").
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Although compensation provides an important remedy to the violations
created by an amnesty, it may not be sufficient. While there are few
decisions that directly address the issue, there is some suggestion that
more than reparations are required in response to gross violations of
human rights.9"
5.

The Right to Access to a Court

Finally, amnesties have been found to violate an individual's right to
a fair trial.9 The right to a fair trial is most often associated, at least in
the United States, with the rights of a criminal defendant in the context
of a state prosecution. The language of the American Convention, and
its interpretation by the Inter-American Commission and Court, include
within such a right the right of "[e]very person.. .to a hearing, with due
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent,
and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in
92
the... determination of his rights and, obligations of a civil... nature.
The argument is that by foreclosing access to the civil courts, amnesties
violate the right of a human rights victim to have her rights established
by a tribunal previously established by law. Victims are thus entitled to
some participatory role in the determination of their rights, and thus
some role in determining whether an amnesty should be granted or not.
C.

Amnesties, Social Stability, Deterrence,and the Rule of Law

Third, it is argued that, even assuming amnesties contribute to shortterm social stability, in the long-term they undercut efforts to establish a
stable democracy that honors human rights and the rule of law. The
argument is that such amnesties send a signal to would-be violators that
if they are powerful enough to create enough uncertainty or instability,
they may escape accountability. Amnesties therefore violate the general
obligation of states to protect and ensure the fundamental rights of its
citizens, including the enjoyment of a safe and secure existence. Aryeh
Neier argues eloquently against "giving in" to amnesties, noting that
they create a culture of impunity that only encourages further human
90. See Parada Cea, Case 10.480, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1 at

122

("the Commission has

established that amnesties and their effects may not interfere with the right of the victims or their
survivors to obtain, at least, due compensation for violations of the human rights enshrined in the
American Convention") (emphasis added).
91. See Lincoleo v. Chile, Case 11.711, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser. L./V./II.1 11, doc. 20
(2001),
5 8-65.
92. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(1), OEA/ser. L./V./II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 at

25 (1992) (emphasis added).
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rights violations.93 This is fundamentally an argument about the
importance of preserving the perception, if not the reality, of a coherent
and just social order.94
States that have enacted amnesties, as well as some commentators,

argue that social stability and peace are indeed made possible by such
amnesties. 95 Amnesties have been justified at the end of an armed
conflict or the change of a regime as the realistic price one has to pay

for ending a destructive war or removing a government that has
committed gross violations of human rights in the past. Such a trade-off
is defended as a necessary condition to ensure contemporary peace and
social stability, and to prevent further human rights violations. 96 In other
words, the argument is that if amnesty is not granted, the regime that
has perpetrated gross violations of human rights will remain in power

and engage in further violations. The trade-off, then, is not between
victims of past abuses and accountability for perpetrators, but between
victims of past abuses and yet to be identified victims of future abuses.
Alexander Hamilton argued for the use of amnesties to further peace:
"In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments,
when a well timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may
93. NEIER, supra note 12, at 103-07.
94. The United Nations Security Council appears to support this view, arguing in the
instruments creating the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda that the
restoration and maintenance of peace in those countries is linked to asserting accountability for
international crimes. See G.A. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR S/RES/827 (1993); G.A. Res. 955 U.N.
SCOR S/RES/955 (1994). The Security Council's resolution authorizing negotiations for a
special court for Sierra Leone also asserted a link between accountability and peace. G.A. Res.
315 U.N. SCOR S/RES/1315 (2000). The Preamble to the Rome Statute establishing the
permanent international criminal court also links accountability to long-term peace. See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter I.C.C. statute], opened for signature July
17, 1998, preamble, U.N. Docs A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998
95. See Hesse & Post, supra note 34, at 20-21 (amnesty in some situations may be best path
to reconciliation and the creation of a legitimate legal order). Some commentators who lean
toward the social stability justification for amnesties are reluctant to allow amnesties for the worst
crimes, such as crimes against humanity. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Need for Moral
Reconstruction in the Wake of Past Human Rights Violations: An Interview with Jose Zalaquett,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS, supra note 34, at 195, 199 (Zalaquett stating that
although forgiveness and magnanimity may serve society better in some circumstances, crimes
against humanity cannot be the subject of such forgiveness).
96. See, e.g., Statement of the Government of El Salvador in response to the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights' demand that El Salvador repeal its 1993 amnesty law. Ellacuria,
Case 10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 136 at 244 (noting that the amnesty law "constituted a necessary
measure for overcoming the state of violence and acute confrontation experienced by Salvadorans
during the armed conflict...."); see also statement by President Clinton that granting amnesty to
the military regime in Haiti was necessary to avoid "massive bloodshed..... Remarks at White
House Press Conference (Sept. 19, 1994), quoted in Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for
Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute InternationalCrimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 9
(1996); and statements by President Kabbah defending the Sierra Leonean amnesty as furthering
peace, in Gallagher, supra note 9, at 183 n.241.
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restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to
pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall."97

(Although Hamilton refers to pardon, he is clearly talking about
amnesties properly defined.) In justifying the use of its general amnesty
law to release the killers of the Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar
Arulfo Romero y Galdamez, the government of El Salvador described
amnesty as a "measure aimed at ensuring the existence of a new
democratic State at peace [and] as the only way to safeguard human
rights."9"
The causal relationships among amnesties, social stability,
deterrence, and the rule of law are unclear. We do have some anecdotal
evidence, although such evidence does not clearly support any particular
argument concerning causation. For example, in both Chile and
Argentina, individual accountability was foreclosed in the name of
facilitating a peaceful transition. In Chile, General Pinochet passed a
sweeping blanket amnesty in 1978 protecting all members of the
government from accountability for past crimes committed in
connection with the General's regime. While Argentina initiated some
important prosecutions, they quickly gave way to a series of statutes that
provided an effective amnesty to those involved in that country's "Dirty
War." It is difficult to say whether such protections for human rights
violators were necessary to facilitate a transition to democracy in each
case, or whether the transitions would have occurred anyway but with a
higher level of violence.99 It is easier to observe today, however, that the
effort to place a permanent lid on the desire for accountability failed."t°
The amnesty laws in both Chile and Argentina (as well as in other
countries) have been challenged and either partially or completely lifted.
On the one hand, the examples of Chile and Argentina suggest that
amnesties are ill-advised and will not last; moreover, they suggest that
attempts to prevent accountability in the name of social stability will not
work. This argument is supported by the fact that the cries for
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton is quoted by the court in the
Nixon pardon case of Murphy v. Ford 390 F.Supp 1372, 1373 (W.D. Mich. 1975), and in turn by
the court in Phillip v. Directorof Public Prosecutionsof Trinidad, 1 All ER 665, at 668 (1992),
quoting Murphy, 390 F.Supp at 1373.
98. Romero v. El Salvador, Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37, OEA/ser. LN./II.106, 3.

99. Michael Scharf concedes that the amnesty granted to the Haitian military regime at the
insistence of the U.S. and the UN "[i]n the short run.. .achieved far more for the restoration of
human rights in Haiti than what would have resulted by insisting on punishment and risking
political instability and continued social divisiveness." Scharf, supra note 96, at 11.

100. In contrast, some commentators point to Mozambique as an example of an amnesty that
successfully ended a conflict and resulted in the creation of a stable democracy. Gallagher, supra
note 9, at 188.
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accountability in both of these cases ultimately appear to have
triumphed over the cries for caution and stability.' On the other hand,
the examples of Chile and Argentina may in fact point to a third way112
between immediate individual accountability and permanent impunity.
The cases of Chile and Argentina illustrate the use of a short-term
amnesty, in which claims for social stability, reconciliation, and
building the rule of law take precedence over individual accountability
and retribution. Argentina and Chile demonstrate, however, that shortterm amnesty eventually gives way to individual accountability. It
would appear from these two examples that while accountability may be
an unattractive option in the immediate aftermath of a change in regime,
it becomes a viable option after the passage of a period of time
sufficient to stabilize the new regime and societal norms. One might
therefore conclude that the preferred transitional policy would be to
offer short-term protection from accountability for violative regimes
that agree to transfer power peacefully, with the expectation that once
the new regime is established and stable, such individuals may be held
accountable. Of course, as a proposal to guide future transitions this
appears very impractical. If we accept the argument that the Pinochets
of the world will not give up power without protection against
accountability for their past wrongful acts, it is not clear why they
would agree merely to postpone accountability as a condition for giving
up power.
What is clear is that the forward-looking argument that amnesties
ensure peaceful transitions and the creation of a human rights protective
society is limited to a particular historical period. As amnesties that
were intended to last in perpetuity unravel in the face of domestic and
international pressures for accountability, the utility of using such
amnesties to entice violative regimes to give up power peacefully
diminishes. Even if we accept the hypothesis that such amnesties were
necessary for facilitating earlier transitions, and that impunity was the
price to be paid for future stability and protection of human rights in
countries like Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala, it is not
clear that as a matter of practice such a dynamic will work in the future.
The reality appears to be that societies will only tolerate such impunity
for a limited period of time, and that eventually those who perpetrated
101. In contrast, the Uruguayan public rejected by a comfortable margin of fifty-three to forty
percent a referendum to overturn an amnesty passed four years earlier. See The World, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 18, 1989.
102. Not a third way in the

sense that the supporters

of the

South African Truth and

Reconciliation Commission mean. The South African supporters refer to that country's
commission as a third way between criminal trials and amnesty; a third way that consists of what
I call an accountable amnesty.
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gross violations of human rights in the past will be held to account. As a
principle that might be used to support the legitimacy of amnesties
generally, the social stability argument appears to be losing its power as
existing amnesties yield to both domestic and international pressures for
accountability.
International law, however, provides some clear principles that can be
used to evaluate amnesties. First, authoritative statements concerning a
state's obligation to prosecute and punish those responsible for gross
violations of human rights clearly establish a minimal requirement of
accountability. The limited jurisprudence on the question and
contradictory state practice make it difficult to assert with any
confidence a more specific obligation. Second, victims of gross
violations of human rights are entitled to some form of truth,
reparations, and participation. Amnesties that significantly advance
these four principles (accountability, truth, reparations, and
participation) are more likely to be considered legitimate, and thus
deserve support, recognition, and enforcement.
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ANALOGOUS LAW
Having derived four guiding principles from international law to
evaluate amnesties for gross violations of human rights, I now turn to a
discussion of six analogous areas of developed legal practice in the
Anglo-American tradition. I look to these six areas of law to place
amnesties in the context of other less controversial legal principles that
justify not enforcing otherwise applicable legal rules. The six areas of
law include: the recognition and enforcement of a foreign state's official
acts and judgments; non bis in idem (more generally referred to in the
U.S. as the prohibition against "double jeopardy"); the treatment of
human rights violators under international refugee and asylum law; the
political offense exception in extradition law; systemic barriers to
claims-immunities, statutes of limitation, and laches; and pardons. Each
of these areas of law provides justifications for not enforcing an
otherwise applicable rule of law, and thus is relevant to an evaluation of
the legitimacy of amnesties.
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Official Acts' °3

How a legal system treats foreign official acts-and why a legal
system chooses a particular approach to the recognition of such

acts-provides some insight into how a foreign amnesty should be
treated. One possible response to a foreign amnesty, in fact, is to treat it
like any other foreign official act. Amnesties for gross violations of
human rights, however, raise particular legal, political, and moral
concerns not present with most other official acts. It should be noted at
the outset, however, that recognition by a state of a foreign official act
does not necessarily imply a judgment that the act in question is just.
Recognition of a foreign government's official act involves a balancing
between the forces of global integration" (and the desire to create a
stable international legal and political regime through the mutual
recognition of official acts), and substantive values of public policy"'5
and fundamental rights"06 that may not be shared by the two states in
103. There is a difference between recognition and enforcement. The Sabbatino Court was
quite clear that the issue there was recognition of an act performed by a duly recognized foreign
government within its own territory, and not an issue of enforcing such an act extraterritorially.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In the United States Steel Corp. case,
Judge Learned Hand noted that the act of state doctrine concerned recognition of a foreign act
insofar as it affected the rights of third parties, and not the enforcement of the act itself: "Of
necessity no court can enforce the law of another place. It is, however, the general law of all
civilized peoples that, in adjusting the rights of suitors, courts will impute to them rights and
duties similar to those which arose in the place where the relevant transactions occurred."
Direction Der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 F. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y.
1924) (internal citations omitted).
In the case of amnesties granted for acts in violation of international law, the important
question raised here is whether the forum jurisdiction will recognize such an amnesty in response
to a claim brought under municipal or international law, and thus dismiss the claim.
104. See, e.g., Bi v. Union Carbide, 984 F.2d. 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1993) ("were we to pass
judgment on the validity of India's response to a disaster that occurred within its borders, it would
disrupt our relations with that country andfrustrate the efforts of the internationalcommunity to
develop methods to deal with problems of this magnitude in thefuture") (emphasis added). AnneMarie Slaughter, in an important article analyzing the U.S. act of state doctrine, made a similar
point regarding the recognition of foreign laws among "liberal" states. Anne-Marie Burley
[Slaughter], Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalismand the Act of State Doctrine,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1919 (1992) ("This core of common values and institutions [among
liberal states] ensures that in most cases states can disagree with the specific policy choices
embedded in each other's national laws but nevertheless respect those laws as legitimate means to
the same ultimate ends.").
105. For example, in United States v. Belmont the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing
an appeal from a New York federal district court, refused to give effect to the expropriation of
private property by the Soviet Union because such acts were contrary to the public policy of the
New York forum. United States v. Belmont, 85 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1936).
106. Such fundamental rights may, of course, include those that have risen to a high level of
international consensus, and thus less clearly illustrate a clash between different policies of
competing sovereigns. See, e.g., John Sanderson & Co. (Wool) Pty. Ltd. v. Ludlow Jute Co., 569
F.2d 696, 697 (1st Cir. 1978) (foreign judgments should not be recognized if in violation of
international law). The application of those internationally recognized rights through the refusal
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question. Generally, the recognition of a foreign legislative or executive
act, or a judgment of a foreign court, presumes that the foreign act or
judgment is not manifestly unjust or does not violate a strongly held
principle of public policy of the forum state. It is not an inquiry,
therefore, as to whether the recognizing state would itself have granted
amnesty in such a case.' °7 Instead, it is whether the granting of amnesty
by the requesting state is so abhorrent to the requested state's notions of
justice as to make its recognition untenable. Justice Cardozo, before
joining the U.S. Supreme Court, articulated this tension between the
legal culture of the forum state and that of the foreign state: "We are not
so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong
because we deal with it otherwise at home." 108
The law of foreign recognition suggests three basic approaches a
foreign state or international institution may take with regard to an
amnesty granted for gross violations of human rights. The first approach
is to recognize and defer absolutely to the amnesty granted by the
perpetrator's state without inquiring into its substance, procedure or
context (the "absolute deference" approach). The second is to examine
the substance of the amnesty and judge its legitimacy, and thus its
enforceability (the "selective deference" approach). The question raised
by this second approach is what criteria should such a decision-maker
use to judge an amnesty's legitimacy. The third approach is to give no
effect to the amnesty and insist that the individual claiming its
protection be held accountable (the "anti-deference" approach). Each of
these three approaches to amnesties is currently adopted by different
institutional actors internationally.
Generally, a court's willingness to recognize a foreign official act
turns in part on whether the act is civil or criminal in nature. Foreign
criminal and tax laws, and their corresponding judgments, are generally
not recognized and enforced by another state's courts. Foreign official
acts that do not fit within the criminal or tax area may be recognized and
enforced if certain minimal conditions are met.

to recognize a foreign official act that violates them contributes to, rather than detracts from,
global integration.
107. See, e.g., Union Carbide, 984 F.2d at 586 ("It is not relevant to our determination
whether, under our constitutional standards, our Government could pass an act similar to the
Bhopal Act.") The case arose out of the thousands of deaths and injury caused by the leakage of
deadly gas from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India. The Indian Parliament passed a statute
granting to the Indian Government the exclusive right to represent the victims of the disaster both
in India and throughout the rest of the world.
108. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201-02 (N.Y. 1918).
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Recognition of ForeignPenalActs
Early U.S. and English case law establish that a state should not

enforce the penal laws and sentences of another state; that at least
regarding the application of foreign criminal law, a state generally
defers to the territorial jurisdiction."° Most states follow this rule of
criminal abstention."' An exception to this general rule can be found

among states that are closely aligned politically, economically,
militarily, and culturally."'

Leaving aside this

exception, penal

sanctions traditionally have had no extra-territorial effect. One might
extend this prohibitory rule to criminal law amnesties," 2 reasoning that

an amnesty is like any other criminal judgment or sentence, and thus
should not be given extra-territorial effect.
The traditional policy arguments against recognizing foreign penal
judgments do not apply with equal force to the recognition of amnesties
today. At the time the doctrine of non-recognition of foreign penal

judgments developed in the common law, it was generally accepted that
states only had an interest in criminal acts committed within their own
territory. Consequently states had no jurisdiction or authority to enforce
a penal law or judgment arising from a foreign jurisdiction.1 3 In his
109. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892).
Crimes and offences against the laws of any state can only be defined, prosecuted, and
pardoned by the sovereign authority of that state; and the authorities, legislative,
executive, or judicial, of other states take no action with regard to them, except by way
of extradition, to surrender offenders to the state whose laws they have violated, and
whose peace they have broken.
Id.
110. See, e.g., Matthew Goode, The Tortured Tale of Criminal Jurisdiction, 21 MELB. U. L.
REV. 411, 453 (1997) ("The general rule is that the courts will not recognise or enforce the
criminal or penal judgment of another forum."). For a U.S. statement to this effect, see The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
111. See European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, Europe
T.S. No. 70 (entered into force, July 26, 1974), reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
625-39 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
112. By "criminal law amnesty" I mean an amnesty that provides protection from criminal
law liability; thus a "civil law amnesty" means an amnesty that provides protection from civil law
liability. Unless I otherwise specify, I will use the term "amnesty" by itself to refer collectively to
amnesties that provide protection from either or both criminal and civil law liability.
113. In the 1888 case Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., Justice Gray, writing for the
Supreme Court, expounded upon the policies and implications underlying the reluctance of a state
to engage with a foreign penal judgment, expanding the rule of forbearance to include any
judgment in favor of a State:
The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies not
only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor
of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the
protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties.
If this were not so, all that would be necessary to give ubiquitous effect to a penal law
would be to put the claim for a penalty into the shape of a judgment.
Lord Kames, in his Principles of Equity, cited and approved by Mr. Justice Story in
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famous Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Story writes:
The common law considers crimes as altogether local, and
cognizable and punishable exclusively in the country where they
are committed. No other nation therefore has any right to punish

them, or is under any obligation to take notice of or to enforce
any judgment rendered in such cases by the tribunals having
authority to hold jurisdiction within the territory where they are
committed. "4
The global legal environment today is markedly different from when
these rules concerning foreign judgments developed. We have
witnessed a radical evolution of international criminal law in the last

half century, an evolution that has further accelerated in the last decade.
The provincial concern with only local wrongs has given way to a
growing acceptance of universal jurisdiction over certain gross
violations, as well as a dramatic increase in states asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction over criminal activity." 5
The non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign penal

judgments, however, acquires a new justification when viewed in light
of one of the fundamental concerns that gave rise to the modem

international human rights movement: the protection of the individual
against the power of the state. The reluctance to enforce a foreign penal
judgment can be justified on the theory that one state should not assist
another state in the criminal punishment of an individual. This is a
concern animated by the ideal of individual human rights and the

protection of the individual from the power and violence of the state." 6
This is particularly so in the case of a state asserting the right to punish
a foreign citizen based on a conviction in a foreign jurisdiction. The
protection of a national of one state against the power of another state
his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, after having said, "The proper place for
punishment is where the crime is committed, and no society takes concern in any crime
but what is hurtful to itself;" and recognizing the duty to enforce foreign judgments or
decrees for civil debts or damages, adds, "[b]ut this includes not a decree decerning for a
penalty; because no court reckons itself bound to punish, or to concur in punishing, any
delict committed extra territorium."
Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888) (internal citations omitted).
114. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 620 (8th ed. 1883).
115. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2322 (1994) (U.S. assertion of criminal jurisdiction over anyone
who kills, conspires to kill, or seriously injures a U.S. national).
116. One commentator has wryly noted the arrogant version of this concern adopted by the
United States. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, InternationalJudicial Assistance in Criminal Matters,
7 VILL. L. REV. 193, 220 (1961) ("Unfortunately, American courts have excelled in unfriendly
attitudes toward all questions relating to foreign criminal proceedings, in the erroneous belief that
ours alone is a system which guarantees fairness to a criminal defendant.").
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was a legitimate concern of international law and international relations
long before the development of the current belief that a state's treatment
of its own citizens is an area of legitimate international concern.
Unlike a foreign penal judgment, recognizing and enforcing an
amnesty does not involve the application of force by a state against an
individual. On the contrary, it involves the explicit refusal to exert such
power over an individual. The human rights concerns raised by the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign penal sanction differ from
those raised by the recognition or enforcement of a foreign amnesty. In
the case of a foreign penal judgment, the concern is with the human
rights of the foreign citizen-his protection as a criminal defendant
against the power of the foreign state.
In the case of a foreign amnesty, while the concern for the right of the
foreign citizen as a criminal defendant is relevant, there is another
human rights concern: the rights of those harmed by the person granted
amnesty. The rights of the criminal defendant are less central in the case
of a foreign amnesty than a foreign penal judgment. In particular, the
concern with a foreign penal judgment centers on the compatibility of
the two states' criminal justice systems. Different substantive and
procedural provisions, including what acts constitute a criminal offense,
and what is the standard of proof required to convict a suspect, may
make one state less willing to enforce what in its own system might be
considered an unjust law or a judgment arrived at using unjust
procedures. In the case of the recognition of a foreign amnesty,
however, it is more likely that the substantive law to be applied will be
international." 7 This is not to say that neither international law nor its
application may be controversial, but that the tension is not between two
states' legal systems. Instead, it is between one state's legal system and
the international legal system." 8
In addition to these concerns of the states involved, both foreign
penal judgments and amnesties raise a more general concern shared by
the international community in enforcing criminal justice. With respect
to a foreign penal judgment, the concern is that a convicted criminal not
escape accountability by fleeing to a foreign jurisdiction. This is
generally addressed by extraditing the individual back to the original

117. The relevant law could be domestic in the case of an amnesty for an act that does not

violate international law but violates the law of the foreign state in which an amnesty recipient is
located. I am unaware of any cases involving such a situation and am concerned here more with
the legitimacy of amnesties granted for acts that violate international law.
118. Of course, the procedural rules to be applied in applying international law are generally
those of the forum state, and thus may raise serious concerns by the amnesty-granting state and

the amnesty recipient.
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jurisdiction." 9 With respect to a foreign amnesty, the concern is that
those who violate international criminal law do not escape
accountability through the illegitimate act of their own state. While
transferring the individual back to the original jurisdiction satisfies the
shared criminal justice interests of states in the case of a foreign penal
judgment, there is no such easy solution in the case of amnesties. If the
amnesty is in violation of international law, sending the recipient back
to the original jurisdiction that granted the amnesty does not satisfy the
requirement of accountability, other than imposing on the recipient
violator the sanction of being confined to the territory of the amnestygranting state. The alternative then is for the state to either prosecute or
otherwise hold the recipient accountable itself, or transfer the individual
to another state or international entity that will hold the individual
accountable.
In fact, the general reluctance to at least recognize, if not enforce,
foreign penal judgments has never been absolute. U.S. courts have
routinely recognized foreign convictions as past offenses in determining
the appropriate sentence for a crime committed in the U.S. 2 ' In those
cases, however, the courts have looked beyond the mere fact of the
foreign conviction itself to determine whether the process by which the
conviction was awarded met the minimal due process requirements that
would have applied if the prosecution occurred in the United States.'
Immigration courts have also recognized foreign convictions for the
purpose of determining whether an alien should be deported from the
United States.'
The reluctance of a state to enforce or recognize the penal judgments
of another state and the parochial justifications for that reluctance have
also declined with the increase in international law and cooperation. In
119. The 1990 U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition allows a state to make an amnesty granted
by either party grounds for refusing extradition. Model Treaty on Extradition, G. A. Res. 45/116,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 100, U.N. Doc. A/RES./45/116 (1991), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 1407, 1412, art. 3(e). The European Treaty on extradition also allows a state to rely on its

own amnesty to refuse an extradition request. Convention Drawn Up on the Basis of Article K.3
of the Treaty on European Union, Relating to Extradition Between the Member States of the
European Union, art. 9, 1996 (O.J. (C313) 12. For a summary of the treaty provisions, see
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/printversion/en/lvb (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
120. Such situations arise in states with multiple offender statutes that do not limit themselves

to prior convictions in the U.S. See A. Kenneth Pye, The Effect of Foreign CriminalJudgments
within the United States, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 479, 493 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller &
Edward M. Wise eds., 1965).
121. Id.

122. See, e.g., Squires v. INS, 689 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1982) (use of Canadian conviction to
find alien deportable); and Brice v. Pickett, 515 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1975) (use of Japanese
conviction to find alien deportable).
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the European community, for example, the penal judgments of one state
may, by treaty, be enforced in another state. 2 3 In addition, the idea that
crimes are of purely local concern has given way to laws of
international criminal responsibility and universal jurisdiction. The
United States, for example, has agreed to recognize the criminal
judgments of most states in which the U.S. stations troops." 4
Both traditional and modem justifications for the non-recognition and
non-enforcement of foreign penal judgments do not apply to foreign
amnesties. If anything, the human rights-related concerns that justify the
non-recognition of penal judgments also justify the non-recognition of a
foreign amnesty. Legal doctrines and principles concerning foreign
penal judgments that might argue for deference to a foreign amnesty
thus have limited applicability to amnesties for gross violations of
human rights.
2.

Recognition of Non-PenalActs

Recognition' 25 of official acts outside of the criminal and tax areas is
governed by judicially-created doctrines (such as the Anglo-American
act of state doctrine), comity (in the case of the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments),'26 and international treaties.'27
a.

Act of State Doctrine

The act of state doctrine provides that a court will not pass judgment
on an official act of a foreign sovereign committed within its own
territory. It is a doctrine frequently used in the United Kingdom and the
United States, the origins of which are traced to an 1848 House of Lords
123. See, e.g., European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments,
supra note 111.
124. Such recognition is pursuant to the Status of Forces Agreements between the United
States and the allied country. See generally Daniel L. Pagano, Criminal Jurisdictionof United
States Forces in Europe, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 189 (1992).
125. See supra note 103.
126. The enforcement of foreign judgments is primarily governed by municipal, and not
international, law, with the exception of judgments governed by bilateral or multilateral treaties.
Enforcement of a foreign judgment is generally resisted if there is evidence of fraud, if the foreign
judgment is contrary to the public policy of the forum, or if the foreign judgment is based on a
government claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 98, cmt. h (1989).
127. European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction of Courts and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1968), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969). The Hague
Conference on International Law is currently drafting a treaty on the recognition and enforcement
of judgments that would be open to all states for ratification. In 1971 the Hague Conference
concluded a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, but as of January 1999 only had three parties (Cyprus, the Netherlands, and
Portugal). See website of Hague Conference on Private International Law at
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/menui6e.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2000).
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decision in the U.K. 128 and an 1897 Supreme Court case in the U.S. 129
While mostly present in jurisdictions associated with the AngloAmerican legal tradition, the act of state doctrine has been adopted in
one form or another by a few other foreign jurisdictions.' Within the
United States, its most classic formulation is found in the first two
sentences of the Supreme Court's 1897 opinion in Underhill v.
Hernandez:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of

every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.'
The act of state doctrine precludes a claim or defense that relies upon

13 2
an assertion that a foreign official act was illegal under foreign law.
The doctrine is most often applied in cases involving executive acts,
although it has also been raised in cases involving foreign legislation.'33

128. Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 9 Eng. Rep. 993 (H.L. 1848).
129. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Underhill was not, however, the first
appearance of the act of state doctrine in the United States. In 1876 a New York Supreme Court
raised the act of state doctrine in a case brought against the former head of state of the Dominican
Republic. Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876). Michael Ramsey suggests that
this might be the earliest reference to the act of state doctrine in the United States. Michael
Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 58 n.223
(1998).
130. See LASSA OPPENHEIM, I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 365-376 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (citing Iranian Mixed Marriages Case, 57 I.L.R. 10
(Germany 1967); Libyan American Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic 62 I.L.R.
140, 199 (1977) (opinion of sole arbitrator Mahmassani). The Italian Court of Cassation has held
that international law prescribes a state court from reviewing the official act of a foreign state, and
has incorporated that international law rule into its domestic legal system. S.P.A. Imprese
Marittime Frasinetti v. Republica Araba di Libia, reprinted in 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 163, 164 (1983).
131. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (1897); see also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,
304 (1918) ("To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and
perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations
between governments and vex the peace of nations."'). For a British articulation of the sovereign
equality justification of the act of state doctrine, see Salaman v. Secretary of State in Council of
India, 1 K.B. 613, 639 (Eng. C.A. 1906) (Fletcher Moulton, L.J.) ("An act of State is essentially
an exercise of sovereign power, and hence cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by
municipal courts.").
132. See, e.g. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303-04 (rejecting on act of state grounds claim that title to
property acquired from Mexican government was invalid because the government illegally
confiscated the property from its previous owner).
133. See Burley, supra note 104 at 1996 n.77, citing to United States v. Sisal Corp., 274 U.S.
268, 276 (1927) (foreign legislation enacted after defendants solicited government does not
provide act of state defense); see also Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping 'InternationalComity, 83
IOWA L. REv. 893, 915 (1998).
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A search of U.S. court decisions yields no cases involving a foreign
amnesty in which the act of state doctrine was applied. This result may
have more to do with the paucity of decisions regarding foreign
amnesties than any concern about the applicability of the act of state
doctrine. If applied, the act of state doctrine would result in the
recognition and effective enforcement of the foreign amnesty. The
important question here, however, is the appropriateness of applying the
act of state doctrine to a foreign amnesty. In other words, is the
application of the doctrine to a31 4foreign amnesty consistent with the
policies underlying the doctrine?
While there are numerous justifications for the act of state
doctrine-and some debate among scholars about which is the most
cogent and accurate-there are three justifications that are relevant to the
question of foreign amnesties: 1) the inherent powers of sovereign
equality and comity among sovereigns; 2) the political, in particular
foreign policy, ramifications of such a judgment; and 3) particularly in
the United States, domestic separation of power concerns (also known
as the political question doctrine, and focused on the political, rather
than legal, nature of the judgment at issue). The second and third
justifications are often melded together, but they represent two very
distinct concerns. The second focuses on what I would call "external"
institutional competence: the competence of a court to address disputes
in a particular subject matter area, in this case foreign policy. The third
focuses on what I would call "internal" institutional competence-the
competence of a court to address a particular type of dispute irrespective
of the substantive matter at issue-in this case judgments that are
essentially political, as opposed to legal, in nature. For example, a court
might decline to pass judgment on a foreign act because such a decision
would have serious ramifications for the country's foreign relations,
even though there is a clear answer under applicable law. Such a court
might reasonably conclude that the political branches are in a better
position to assess the risk of such ramifications. On the other hand, a
court might decline to pass judgment on a foreign act not because of any
foreign policy concerns, but because there are no clear rules of decision
that the court can apply to resolve the dispute, making the decision a
predominantly political rather than legal one.
The classic statement of the first justification mentioned above for the
134. The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly adopted this policy-oriented approach to the
application of the act of state doctrine, in effect holding that even if the act of state doctrine by its
terms applies to a dispute, if the policies underlying the doctrine are not furthered the court should
refrain from its application. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493
U.S. 400 (1990), citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
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act of state doctrine-sovereign equality and comity-is found in the first
two sentences from Underhill quoted above. The political ramification
concern Js reflected in the opinions of numerous federal circuits. The

Ninth Circuit, for example, in De Blake v. Republic of Argentina noted
that the act of state doctrine "reflects the prudential concern that the
courts, if they question the validity of sovereign acts taken by foreign

states, may be interfering with the conduct of American foreign policy
by the Executive and Congress." 3 ' The separation of powers concern is

also reflected in the opinions of numerous federal courts, most notably
the U.S. Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. The
Court in Sabbatino noted that absent a clear rule of controlling
international law, the determination of the validity of a foreign official
act is a political, rather than a legal, inquiry for which courts are illsuited. 36

Each of these justifications provides some insight into how we might
treat the special case of a foreign amnesty. To the extent that principles
of sovereign equality and comity are embraced as the primary

justifications for the application of the act of state doctrine, and to the
extent that such principles are interpreted to require near absolute
deference to the official acts of a foreign government, foreign amnesties
should be regularly recognized. Even those who identify sovereign

equality and comity as the underlying principles of the act of state
doctrine recognize that such absolute deference is neither required nor
desired. First, such an absolutist position is in tension with other
prudential doctrines regarding foreign official acts. As noted above, it is
135. See De Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Bigio v. CocaCola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 452 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he policy concerns underlying the doctrine
require that the political branches be preeminent in the realm of foreign relations."); Grupo
Protexa S.A. v. All Am. Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1994) (act of state doctrine is
concerned with "potential institutional conflict between the judiciary and political branches such
that a judicial inquiry.. could embarrass the political branches in their conduct of foreign
affairs."); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1387
(5th Cir. 1992) ("The act of state doctrine serves to enhance the ability of the executive branch to
engage in the conduct of foreign relations...."); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The policy concerns underlying the [act of state]
doctrine focus on the preeminence of the political branches, and particularly the executive, in the
conduct of foreign policy."); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 831 (1 1th Cir.
1984) ("The act of state doctrine is primarily designed to avoid impingement by the judiciary
upon the conduct of foreign policy by the Executive Branch."); and Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976) (act of state doctrine "derives from the
judiciary's concern for its possible interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by the political
branches of the government").
136. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432-33 (noting that the act of state doctrine appropriately
restricts courts to their traditional role as law interpreters rather than law makers, the latter being
appropriately reserved to the executive and legislative branches).
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widely accepted that foreign penal and revenue laws, for example, are
regularly not enforced. Second, the doctrine has never been applied in
the United States to support such an absolutely deferential
interpretation. One can see this rejection in 1) dicta in Sabbatino
suggesting that deference may be overcome in the face of a clear and
applicable rule of international law, 2) the "Sabbatino" Amendment to
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 directing the courts to abstain from
applying the act of state doctrine in most cases involving property
expropriation,"' and 3)judicial decisions holding that the doctrine does
not apply to official acts that constitute a gross violation of human
rights. 3 '
In contrast to the Anglo-American tradition, civil law systems are
less reluctant to pass judgment on the official acts of a foreign
sovereign, and do so by applying the public policy exception developed
in private international law.139 French courts, for example, have held that
foreign laws that do not violate international law but are contrary to
French public policy will not be given effect. 40 This is particularly so in
the case of foreign expropriation laws. An important exception to this
general rule in France concerns legislation designed to remedy a past
illegal act. While French courts generally will not recognize or give
effect to foreign acts of expropriation, legislation invalidating title to
property granted under a belligerent occupant (and thus granted
illegally) has been given effect by a French court. 4 ' Corrective
legislation like that recognized by the French court is similar to a
corrective amnesty, suggesting that a French court might have little
trouble in recognizing at least a corrective amnesty.
b.

International Comity
International comity, in addition to providing a justification for the

137. 22 U.S.C.§ 2370(e)(2).
138. See Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 889-90 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1545 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §443, cmts.
b, c (1987).
in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. See
139. This is the case
OPPENHEIM, supra note 130, at 372 n.6 (citing relevant cases refusing to recognize foreign
expropriation laws). All of the cases referred to in Oppenheim applied to foreign legislation that
expropriated property within its own territory. The public policy test in private international law
is usually reserved for the recognition of foreign judgments.
140. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 130, at 372 n.6, citing, inter alia, Union des Republiques
Socialistes Sovietiques v. Intendant Generaly, reprinted in 4 ANN. DIG. OF PUB. INT'L L. cases,
no. 43, at 67; see also Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 n.21 (noting civil law approach to act of state
doctrine in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, and Japan).
141. OPPENHEIM, supra note 130, at 372, n.6, citing Cassan v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche

Petroleum Maatschappij, 47 I.L.R. 58 (1966).
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act of state doctrine, is also its own discretionary doctrine used by
courts to abstain in cases involving conflicts with foreign official acts.
International comity is a doctrine with an elusive pedigree. One
commentator has described international comity as "an amorphous
never-never land whose borders are marked by fuzzy lines of politics,
courtesy, and good faith."'' 41 It is at base a doctrine for resolving
conflicts among multiple assertions of jurisdiction. The classic, if
unwieldy, expression of international comity by the U.S. Supreme Court
is found in Hilton v. Guyot:

"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws."'
Notwithstanding the court's reference to "legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another nation," comity has generally been applied by
U.S. courts in cases involving competing rules of decision (i.e.,
competing legislative assertions, which is the subject internationally of
private international law and domestically of conflicts of law),"
competing assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction (i.e., competing judicial
assertions of competence),'45 or a pre-existing foreign judgment (i.e.,
competing judicial acts).'46 A foreign amnesty could be interpreted as
fitting within any of these three categories. An amnesty involving a
gross violation of human rights, however, might be treated quite
differently than other foreign acts. In fact, some U.S. courts have been
reluctant in recent years to use the doctrine of international comity to
foreclose judicial review of cases that implicate important policies of
the domestic, U.S., forum. 4 ' Certainly providing accountability for
142. Harold Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a Crossroads: The Intersection Between
Public and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 (1982). For a more recent
criticism of the fuzziness of the doctrine as it also relates to the recognition of foreign acts, see
Michael Ramsey, Escaping InternationalComity, 83 IOWA L. REv. 893 (1998).
143. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)
("comity... is a principle under which judicial decisions reflect the systematic value of reciprocal

tolerance and goodwill") (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
145. See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972).

146. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied,405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
147. See Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516. In Allied Bank a
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of human rights would qualify as such an important
gross violations
148
pollIcy.
U.S. courts have consistently chipped away at the broad application
of international comity. In one of its most recent statements regarding
the applicability of comity, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California narrowed the application of the doctrine to
cases presenting a "true conflict" between domestic and foreign law.
The Court found that "true conflict" exists where a person subject to
domestic and foreign law cannot comply with both. 49 In such a case the
domestic law gives way to the foreign law. Hartford Fire involved both
U.K. and U.S. insurance regulatory schemes, and the Court found that
U.K. law did not require (although it may have allowed) conduct that
violates U.S. law, and thus comity did not require deference to the U.K.
law. 150
It is hard to see how the analysis of Hartford Fire would apply to a
foreign amnesty. An amnesty compels a non-action-not asserting or
enforcing a victim's or society's right to redress for gross violations of
human rights. It is not clear under Hartford Fire whether this command
not to assert a right conflicts with the opportunity to assert such a right
in an international or other state's forum. As a matter of policy, given
the strong international consensus for some form of accountability for
gross violations of human rights and the reluctance of courts to
domestically apply comity in cases involving gross violations of human
rights, the doctrine of comity should not be used to defer to a foreign
amnesty.
What guidance does the practice of recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments provide to our efforts to construct a theory of the legitimacy
of amnesties? The law of recognition provides two rules depending on
whether the foreign act at issue is criminal or civil. The general
reluctance of most states to recognize or enforce foreign penal
judgments suggests that foreign amnesties that provide immunity from
creditor sued to enforce the obligation of a Costa Rican bank. The bank defended by citing to a
Costa Rican law prohibiting Costa Ricans from repaying any external (i.e. foreign) obligations.
The Costa Rican law was in response to the country's external debt crisis. While the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals initially deferred to the Costa Rican government act and affirmed the
dismissal of the suit, on rehearing the court reversed itself, stating that U.S. public policy in
enforcing the obligation outweighed international comity. For a brief discussion of the case, see
Ramsey, supra note 142, at 938.
148. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 103-06 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that it
is in the interest of the U.S. to provide a forum for holding individuals accountable for violations

of the law of nations).
149. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993).
150. Id. Justice Scalia, writing in dissent in Hartford Fire, takes a much less strict view of
what constitutes a conflict, as well as a different view of the application of comity analysis to the

U.S. antitrust laws at issue in that case. Id. at 817-22.
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criminal liability should never be recognized. I have, however, noted
two developments that undercut this argument. First, the general
reluctance to recognize foreign penal judgments has begun to break
down among states with strong common interests. While this is still an
exception to the general rule, it does suggest that the general rule is
under some pressure to change. Second, the policy concerns that support
the general rule against recognizing foreign penal judgments do not
apply in the case of foreign amnesties. The concern for the rights of the
defendant that underlie the policy of not recognizing foreign penal
judgments is much less compelling in the case of a foreign amnesty.
The doctrines of act of state and international comity at first blush
appear to suggest that foreign amnesties that provide immunity from
civil liability should be recognized and given deference. The policies
underlying these doctrines, however, and the application of these
doctrines in related cases in the U.S., suggest their inapplicability to
foreign amnesties. International human rights law is in tension with both
doctrines as historically interpreted. If we are to take international
human rights law seriously, as I argue we should, individuals should not
be able to take advantage of the act of state doctrine and international
comity to escape accountability for gross violations of human rights.
B.

Recognition ofForeignJudgments and the Doctrine ofNon Bis
in Idem

The question of whether to recognize a foreign court judgment,
touched upon in the general discussion of recognition above, is raised as
well under the doctrine of non bis in idem. Although the doctrine of non
bis in idem (also referred to as the prohibition against double jeopardy
in the U.S.) arises out of municipal and international criminal law, the
policies that underlie it are relevant to the question of the legitimacy of
foreign amnesties. A question raised by a foreign conviction or
acquittal, and by extension a foreign pardon, is whether another state
may prosecute an individual for an act that has already been "heard" by
another state's courts. The doctrine of non bis in idem is thus most
relevant to an assessment of amnesties that are granted through a
judicial or quasi-judicial process, such as the South African and
Honduran amnesties.
Can a state prosecute an individual for an act even if another state has
already prosecuted, convicted, and punished the individual for the same
act? This was exactly the issue posed in People v. Papaccio. In
upholding the seemingly duplicative New York prosecution of a crime
for which the defendant had been convicted and incarcerated for over
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eight years in Italy, the court noted that a single act may be a violation
of the laws of two governments. In the court's words, the violation of
each law "must be considered as separate and distinct crimes."''
The rule articulated by the New York court in Papaccio is consistent
with the doctrine of "dual sovereignty" articulated by the U.S. Supreme
Court nine years earlier, which allows subsequent federal, state, and

Indian tribe prosecution of the same criminal act in the United States.'52
The U.S. domestic doctrine of dual sovereignty applies only when the

sovereigns are in a hierarchical relationship; that is, between the federal
and state sovereign. In cases involving concurrent jurisdiction by two
equal sovereigns-as is the case when two states are involved-the dual

sovereignty rule is less widely used. Thus, in the U.S., states that share a
river as a border have concurrent jurisdiction over acts that occur in the
river. Rather than resulting in two different prosecutions, however, a
state will defer to the other state that first gains custody of the
accused.5 3
U.S. practice rejects the dual sovereignty exception to double
jeopardy when co-equal sovereigns within a single federal system are

involved. Both common law and civil law legal systems have
recognized foreign acquittals and convictions of a co-equal foreign
sovereign as decisive of an issue.'54
Contemporary U.S. practice follows Papaccio,and does not treat a

prior foreign conviction as a bar to U.S. prosecution for the same
criminal act.' 5 This would suggest that a foreign amnesty-if equated

151. People v. Papaccio, 251 N.Y.S. 717, 720 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County, 1931). Mr.
Papaccio was initially prosecuted in Italy for a crime of murder committed in the U.S. Thus the
basis for the U.S. court jurisdiction was particularly strong, based as it was on the territoriality
principle. Thomas Franck interpreted the U.S. prosecution of Papaccio as an indication of
displeasure at the Italian assertion of jurisdiction based on nationality, rather than territory.
Thomas Franck, An InternationalLawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1096,
1098 (1959).
152. The "separate crimes" theory was first articulated in U.S. v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
For the application of the dual sovereignty rule to Indian tribes, see U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 330-32 (1978) (holding that a federal indictment may follow Navajo conviction).
153. See Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 320 (1909) ("the one first acquiring jurisdiction of
the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality in both states, so that one
convicted or acquitted in the courts of one state cannot be prosecuted for the same offense in the
courts of the other.")
154. See Franck, supra note 151, at 1099-1101 (citing to British, Canadian, French, and
German examples of courts deferring to foreign prosecutions).
155. See United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Fla. 1998), affd 208 F.3d 1282
(11 th Cir. 2000) (previous conviction by a Colombian court for assault against two U.S. DEA
agents did not preclude U.S. prosecution); United States v. Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C.
1999) (Greek prosecution does not preclude U.S. prosecution on related charges as Greece is a
separate sovereign); United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978) (Guatemalan
charges did not bar U.S. charges); United,States v. Martin, 574 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Bahamian trial is not a bar to U.S. prosecution).

-
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with a foreign penal judgment-would not be a bar to prosecution in the

U.S.
In principle, the U.S. does not apply the dual sovereignty exception to

cases involving extradition to a foreign jurisdiction. Most extradition
treaties include a clause that bars the extradition of an individual for an
act that has been the subject of a criminal prosecution in the requested

state.156 In other words, if country A has prosecuted an individual for a
criminal offense, country A is barred from extraditing the individual to
country B for prosecution of the same offense. In practice, however,
extradition usually does occur in such cases as the test used to determine

whether an offense is the same is a strict one.'57 Absent such a treaty
provision, U.S. courts tend to dismiss claims of double jeopardy or non
bis in idem, relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine developed under
the U.S. Constitution. 58

The U.S. is not alone in the application of the dual sovereignty
exception to the international principle of non bis in idem. The

European Convention on Human Rights, for example, explicitly adopts
the dual sovereignty exception.'59 Moreover, the double jeopardy clause
156. See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 1980) (listing extradition treaties
of the U.S. that contain a "double jeopardy" clause, and noting that such clauses have become
common).
157. See, e.g., id.at 177-180 (discussing different tests for determining similarity of domestic
and foreign criminal offense); United States v. Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. 697, 702-04 (1995) (finding
that Maltese prosecution for murder in connection with an airplane hijacking does not preclude
U.S. prosecution for air piracy based on the same events); Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 103-05
(finding that Greek prosecution for terrorist acts concerned different crimes than those of U.S.
prosecution). For an example in which a U.S. prosecution was precluded because of an earlier
foreign prosecution, see United States v. Jurado-Rodriguez, 907 F. Supp. 568, 571 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (U.S. indictment for money laundering dismissed where same acts had already been
prosecuted in Luxembourg "under a rule of substantive law almost identical to the one the United
States relies on....").
158. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996) (prior trial in the
Netherlands does not bar U.S. prosecution); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354,
1362 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (Bahamian prosecution does not preclude U.S. prosecution); Chua Han
Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984) (prosecution by a foreign sovereign
does not preclude U.S. prosecution); United States v. McRary, 616 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Malaysian conviction does not preclude U.S. prosecution); United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d
946, 947 (9th Cir. 1978) (Guatemalan prosecution does not preclude U.S. prosecution); United
States v. Martin, 574 F. 2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) (U.S. has rejected doctrine of international
double jeopardy); Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 100-01 (dual sovereignty doctrine applies to foreign
sovereigns); Benitez, 28 F. Supp 2d, at 1364-65 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (absent treaty, the international
principle of non bis in idem does not apply to U.S. prosecution), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Chukwurah v. United States, 813 F. Supp. 161,
167 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (double jeopardy only applies where the same sovereign is responsible for
successive prosecutions).
159. Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. 117 (1985) ("No one shall be
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"6 has been

interpreted by its Human Rights Committee as applying only to
successive prosecutions by the same sovereign and thus allowing
subsequent prosecution of the same crime by different sovereigns. 6 '
Despite the general acceptance of the dual sovereignty exception, the
two ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the proposed
International Criminal Court generally reject its application. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (I.C.T.Y.),' 62

International Criminal Tribunal for the Territory of Rwanda
(I.C.T.R.), 63 and International Criminal Court"M apply the non bis in
idem prohibition unless the prior national prosecution was designed to

protect the defendant from accountability.
There are very few cases in the United States concerning the

treatment of foreign pardons, and those cases involve the interpretation
liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same
State for an offense for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance
with the law and penal procedure of that State.") (emphasis added). See also Buzunis v. Greece,
App. No. 22997/93 (Dec. 2, 1994) (Commission report) available at www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc/
(" neither the [European Convention on Human Rights] nor any of the additional Protocols does,
either expressly or implicitly, guarantee the principle of n[on] bis in idem in respect of
convictions in different States").
160. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14(7),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1967) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("No one shall be liable to be tried or
punished again for an offense for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.").
161. A.P. v. Italy, Communication No. 204/1986, at para. 7.3, Report of the Hum. Rts.
Comm., 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988), reproduced as an appendix to
Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d at 1288.
162. The I.C.T.Y. statute actually forbids any subsequent prosecution by a national court if
the prior I.C.T.Y. prosecution involved an act that constitutes a serious violation of international
law, but allows subsequent prosecutions by the I.C.T.Y. if the prior national prosecution 1)
characterized the act as an ordinary crime, or 2) was not impartial or independent, or 3) was
designed to shield the defendant from international accountability, or 4) was not diligently
prosecuted. I.C.T.Y. statute, supra note 59, at art. 10.
163. The I.C.T.R. statute has the same provision as the I.C.T.Y. statute. See I.C.T.R. statute,
supra note 59, at art. 9.
164. While the non bis in idem provision in the International Criminal Court statute is worded
differently than that found in the I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R. statutes, it similarly provides that
subsequent prosecutions by the I.C.C. may be allowed if the prior state prosecution was
inadequate. See I.C.C. statute, supra note 94 art. 20; see also art. 17 of the I.C.C. statute (covering
admissibility, and providing that the I.C.C. will not have jurisdiction if a state has investigated the
case and in good faith either prosecuted or declined to prosecute). In the negotiations for the
creation of the I.C.C., both amnesty and pardon were rejected as providing a non bis in idem
defense. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, vol. 1, Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April, and August, 1996,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, para. 174, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (noting proposal that
non bis in idem should include amnesty); cf Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft Statute & Draft Final Act, art. 19, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF/1 83/2/Add. 1 (1988) (unadopted draft article providing that non bis in idem would
not apply in cases of pardon and other suspension of legal enforcement).
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of U.S. immigration law concerning deportation and exclusion. The
issue is whether a foreign pardon issued with respect to a foreign

conviction for a crime of moral turpitude is a bar to entry or basis for
deportation. Under U.S. immigration law, individuals who have been

convicted of a crime of moral turpitude are deportable and excludable.
The overwhelming authority is that foreign pardons are not recognized
for purposes of U.S. immigration law, and thus an individual who was
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude in a foreign country for which a
foreign pardon has been granted is still deportable.16 In contrast, U.S.
courts, including immigration courts, have recognized and given effect
to domestic pardons and found individuals not deportable even though
they had previously been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude." 6 In
one of the more interesting fact patterns involving a pardon, the Board
of Immigration Appeals gave effect to a general pardon and amnesty

issued by the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany in 1955 as it
applied to the conviction of a native of the Soviet Union, then stateless
German Criminal
and resident in the U.S., for a conviction under the
167
Code of the crime of abortion in occupied Germany.

Questions arise as to how amnesties fit within the prohibition against
double jeopardy and the dual sovereignty exception. Should a foreign
165. See Kent v. INS, 28 F.3d 113 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (interpreting
immigration law to give effect only to pardons issued by the President of the United States or a
state governor, and thus denying foreign pardon for drug conviction); Mullen-Cofee v. INS, 976
F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir. 1992) (denying effect of Canadian pardon for narcotics-related
conviction); Sohaiby v. Savoretti, 195 F. 2d 139 (5th Cir. 1952) (denying effect of Cuban pardon
for conviction of prostitution); Weedin v. Hempel, 28 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1928) (denying effect of
German pardon for embezzlement); Palermo v. Smith, 17 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1927) (denying effect
of Italian pardon for murder); Zgodda v. Holland, 184 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (denying
effect of German pardon, or expunction, of German conviction of simple larceny); Matter of
B
7 I. & N. 166 (B.I.A. 1956) (denying effect of Italian pardon for adultery); Matter of
G_ , 5 I. & N. Dec. 129 (B.I.A. 1953) (denying effect of Italian pardon for Italian theft
conviction). There is at least one case in which the Board of Immigration Appeals did give effect
to a foreign pardon for purposes of annulling the immigration effect of a foreign conviction of a
crime of moral turpitude, but the holding of that opinion was subsequently rejected. See In re
Matter of C
, A-7279638 (B.I.A. 1950) (recognizing automatic Italian pardon for adultery
., 5 I. & N.
conviction and thus finding alien not deportable), modified by In re Matter of G
Dec. 129 (B.I.A. 1953) (rejecting recognition of Italian pardon for Italian theft conviction).
166. See United States ex rel. Forino v. Garfinkel, 166 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1948) (stating that a
pardon, if issued by the State of Pennsylvania, would be effective in a deportation proceeding to
annul a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude); Perkins v. U.S. ex rel. Malesevic, 99
F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1938) (recognizing pardon issued by State of Pennsylvania as effective in a
deportation proceeding to annul a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude).
167. Matter ofK
, 9 1 & N Dec. 336 (B.I.A. 1961). The general pardon and amnesty
applied to all persons convicted prior to January 1, 1950 for offenses other than war crimes in a
U.S. military court, provided the sentence was for less than six months in prison or a fine of less
than 1,000 Deutsche marks.
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amnesty be treated like a foreign conviction, acquittal or pardon? It is
only recently that courts have been confronted with the question of what
legal effect to give to a foreign amnesty. The Spanish cases concerning
the prosecution of Pinochet provide one of the few examples in which
the recognition of a foreign amnesty has been raised. While Spanish law
appears to prohibit the prosecution of an individual who is the
beneficiary of certain foreign pardons, the Spanish courts interpreted
the Chilean amnesty as the equivalent of a "standard acquittal for reason
of political convenience," and thus not a bar to Spanish prosecution.' 68
If one were to adopt the dual sovereignty exception to the prohibition
against double jeopardy, then a foreign amnesty should not provide any
more of a barrier to subsequent prosecution than a foreign conviction or
acquittal.'69 Assuming the act for which

amnesty is granted is also

considered an offense against the forum sovereign (as is likely with
gross violations of human rights), the doctrine of dual sovereignty
provides a justification for a foreign prosecution. It is thus unimportant
whether a foreign amnesty is considered similar to a foreign conviction
or acquittal, since in either case a subsequent prosecution is allowed.
If one were to adopt the emerging international law rule that is more
deferential to foreign proceedings, the same question arises concerning
whether a foreign amnesty is similar to a foreign conviction or acquittal.
In this case, however, the answer to this question takes on great
importance. If we adopt the international rule as articulated by the
statute of the International Criminal Court, a foreign amnesty should be
considered legitimate and thus enforced so long as it is not designed to
shield the individual from accountability.
Under the dual sovereignty exception, all types of amnesties fail to
protect an individual from subsequent prosecution. Under the emerging
international rule, accountable and possibly compromise amnesties
would provide such protection.
C. Refugee Law, Asylum, and PersecutedPersecutors
The third category of analogous law highlights the conflict between
different strands of international human rights law: the principles of
accountability under international criminal law, and protection from
discriminatory persecution under international refugee, asylum, and
168. See Antoni Pigrau Sole, The Pinochet Case in Spain, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L.
653, 664 (2000); see also Derechos Human Rights, The Criminal Procedures against Chilean and
Argentinean Repressors in Spain: A Short Summary (1998 ) (interpreting Spanish law not to
allow recognition of Chilean and Argentinean amnesties) availableat
www.derechos.net/marga/papers/spain.html.
169. This is particularly
so in the case of an amnesic amnesty, where the truth and

accountability benefits of a conviction or acquittal are completely absent.
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extradition law. Under international refugee law, an individual is
entitled to protection from being returned to a country where she has a
well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of her race, gender, or
other status, or on account of her beliefs or opinions. There is an
important, and surprisingly non-controversial, exception to this general
rule. If there are "serious reasons for considering" that an individual has
been involved with, among other things, war crimes or crimes against
humanity, that individual may not be protected under the International
Refugee Convention. 7 ' In other words, even if the individual has
demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to his
country of origin, that individual may not take advantage of the
protection provided by refugee law. Furthermore, under most domestic
laws, the individual will not be eligible for the protective status of
asylum.17" ' Under U.S. law, for example, an alien who the Attorney
General determines participated in the persecution of other persons may
be returned to a country even if the Attorney General believes the
alien's life or freedom in that country would be threatened on account of
membership in a particular social group,
his race, religion, nationality,
72
opinion.
or political
From the point of view of an individual state, denying refugee status
to such individuals is justified on two grounds: first, such an individual
may prove to be socially destructive if allowed to remain within the
country; 173 and second, a state may not wish to provide a safe haven to,
and thus in any way condone, the violations of an international criminal.
The first justification is premised on the assumption that past wrongful
170. The Convention's list of excluded individuals is greater than this, encompassing those
for whom there is evidence of involvement in crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, involvement in a "serious non-political crime," or guilty of acts "contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations." United Nations, High Commissioner for
Refugees, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention], art. I(F) (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
These exclusions are in fact derived from art; 14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, one of the most cited sources of human rights in the world. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
171. U.S. law prohibits the benefits of refugee status and political asylum to persons involved
in the persecution of others. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000) (excluding from refugee
protection under U.S. law "any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion"); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (excluding from eligibility
for asylum in the U.S. those who "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion").
172. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (2002).
173. For a discussion of asylum state safety as the purpose of these provisions, see GuY S.
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE ININTERNATIONAL LAW 10 1-04 (2d ed. 1996).
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activity is a strong predictor of future wrongful behavior. 7 4 From the
international point of view, it is hard to discern a principled reason for
collapsing past wrongful activity with current legitimate fears. The
likely justification is one of expediency. Ideally, one would want to
provide some protection for such an individual from the threatened
persecution, while at the same time prosecuting or otherwise holding
him accountable for the alleged crimes. With the permanent
establishment of the International Criminal Court, the options for
addressing this problem at the international level will change, but at
present, the only alternatives open to a state are to prosecute or extradite
to a third state that will prosecute and not persecute.'75
There are thus limits to the otherwise general protections afforded
under international refugee law. Denying refugee status based on one of
these exceptions is a conscious decision not to protect an individual
from persecution. In other words, under international refugee law, the
principle of holding accountable perpetrators of severe and gross
violations of human rights outweighs the normally strong principle of
protection.'76 Yet this punishment does not take the form of a criminal
trial, with all the minimal due process protections required by
international law; instead, the punishment is to return an individual to a
place where he is likely to be persecuted in violation of international
law. The return of an individual to a place where he is likely to be
persecuted in violation of international law is a far more serious
consequence than any restriction, including denial, we might put on a
state's ability to grant amnesty.
If we do not feel strongly enough-morally, ethically, or legally-to
protect such international criminals from illegal persecution,177 it should
be no surprise if we decide not to protect such individuals from legal
174. Under U.S. law, the current threat posed by an alien is sufficient to justify deportation
regardless of whether the alien was previously involved in a war crime or crime against humanity.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)(2002). The Refugee Convention provides separately for a state's

ability to deport dangerous refugees. See Refugee Convention, supra note 170, at arts. 32 and
33(2).
175. Neither the Refugee Convention nor U.S. implementing law require that an individual
excluded under article 1(F) be prosecuted by the deporting state or extradited for prosecution to a

state willing to prosecute or to an international criminal court. Refugee Convention, supra note
170, at art. I(F); 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2).

176. The Handbook of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees advises that the
exclusion categories found in article I(F) should be interpreted narrowly and restrictively, thus

emphasizing the importance of protection as a goal. United Nations, High Commissioner for
Refugees, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev. I (1992).
177. But see Implementation of the Torture Convention in Extradition Cases, 64 Fed. Reg.
9435 (Department of State, Feb. 26, 1999) (allowing withholding of extradition if there is a risk

of torture).
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processes of accountability. Limiting, or denying, amnesties will only
have the effect of exposing an individual to legally appropriate
mechanisms of accountability with all of the applicable due process and
other protections provided by international law-a far less severe result
than failing to protect an individual from persecution allowed by Article
1(F) of the Refugee Convention.
D. ExtraditionLaw: The PoliticalOffense Exception
Extradition law provides a mechanism by which one state (the
"requesting state") may request another state (the "requested state") to
transfer a suspect for prosecution in the requesting state. While
extradition law is governed almost exclusively by bilateral treaties
between states, there are two basic principles that are found in almost all
extradition treaties: the requirement of dual criminality, and the political
offense exception.'78 Both doctrines provide safeguards to protect a state
from participating in an illegitimate prosecution. The dual criminality
requirement ensures that a state will not be required to extradite an
individual for an act which, if committed in the requested state, would
not constitute a crime. The political offense exception allows a state to
refuse extradition if the act upon which the request is based is political.
Each of these requirements provides a possible approach to the
question of a foreign amnesty. Using the dual criminality requirement as
an analogy, one might argue that an amnesty will be recognized and
enforced only if such an amnesty would be legal under the law of the
forum. To the extent the municipal legal system of the forum looks to
international law, principles of international law regarding amnesties
would apply to such an inquiry. Such an approach, however, would rely
more heavily on municipal than international law, and would create an
international system where the same amnesty might provide protection
in one state but not in another.'79

The political offense exception provides useful principles to
178. Treaties of extradition between the Soviet Union and Eastern European states did not
make provision for a political offense exception; nor did extradition between members of the

Commonwealth under the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 130, at
963 n.4.
179. The problems raised by such a municipal law-based approach are no different than those
raised by a system of extradition law based primarily on a bilateral treaty regime. Such an
approach is politically more acceptable where there is a lack of consensus on, in the case of
extradition law, what constitutes a legitimate criminal offense, and in amnesty law, what
constitutes a legitimate amnesty. While Europe and the Americas have a regional extradition
treaty, both recognize the importance of the double criminality requirement to the extradition
regime.
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determine the legitimacy of amnesties. ' ° Most amnesties-and certainly
the most controversial ones that apply to gross violations of human
rights-are justified, sometimes explicitly, as applying only to political,
and not "commonly criminal," acts. Assuming that we accept the
distinction between political and common criminal violence, one might
use the definition of political offense from the more developed
jurisprudence of extradition law to judge the legitimacy of a particular
amnesty. In other words, if we can discern a generally accepted and
defensible definition of political offense in extradition law, we might
conclude that an amnesty is legitimate only if the acts it covers would
qualify as a political offense under such a definition.
The political offense exception was developed after the French
Revolution in response to the support of liberal democratic revolutions
and revolutionaries by, among others, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, Belgium, France, and the United States.' The policies
behind the political offense exception in extradition law are closely tied
to those supporting asylum under refugee law. Both provide protection
to individuals involved in foreign political activities. The political
offense exception provides such an individual with a defense against a
foreign state seeking his prosecution; asylum, if granted, provides such
an individual with the right not to be deported from a host country (in
effect, a defense against an expulsion demand by the host country). In
addition to this protective function, the political offense exception is
justified as shielding from criminal liability individuals who may have
committed acts without the mens rea required by criminal law.' 82
In trying to determine whether an offense qualifies as political or not,
there are three basic approaches. The first focuses on the nature of the
act itself; that is, identifying certain acts as purely political regardless of
the context or motivation of the actor (an objective act approach). The
second focuses on the context in which the act was committed; that is,
identifying any act committed in the context of a political uprising or
conflict as political (an objective context approach). Finally, the third
180. It is not clear whether the political offense exception has garnered enough state support
and clear uniformity of definition to rise to the level of customary international law. As recently
as 1992 the editors of Oppenheim'sInternational Law continued to assert that there was
"probably no rule of customary international law" which prohibits the extradition of individuals
accused of a political offense. OPPENHEIM, supra note 130, at 963, §422.
181. OPPENHEIM, supra note 130, at 962-63, § 421. For an excellent discussion of the
political offense exception, including its history, see CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING
THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
182. Both the protective and mens rea or scienter justifications for the political offense
exception have been cited in U.S. courts. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 720 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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approach focuses on the motivation of the actor; that is, identifying any
act committed with a political conviction as political (a subjective
motive approach). The first two objective tests are found mostly in
common law systems, while the third subjective test is commonly found
in civil law systems. i83
These three approaches to defining a political offense are stated in the

extreme, and there is no court or institution that accepts any of them in
its pure form. Instead, courts have developed three general tests to
determine if an offense qualifies for the exception: the "pure" political
act test; the "predominance" test; and the "incidence" test. Only acts

that are defined as crimes against the state-such as sedition and
treason-qualify as a political offense under the pure political test."' The

predominance test identifies both the political and common criminal
aspects of an offense, and asks whether the political aspect outweighs
the common criminal.185 To weigh the balance, the predominance test
looks at the accused's motivation, the circumstances surrounding the

commission of the crime, and the proportionality between the political
objectives pursued and the means employed.186 The incidence test looks

at the relationship between the act in question and an ongoing
conflict.'87 The narrowest version of the test requires that the act be part
of a power struggle to gain control of the state. Thus, the mere fact that
an act is committed with a motive to further some political cause is not

enough to make it political for purposes of the exception. The British
courts have adopted this narrow approach.188
183. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 181, at 109.
184. The pure political test is sometimes referred to as the French test. For an example of the
French test in practice, see In re Giovanni Gatti, Ct. of App, Grenoble, [1947] ANN. DIG. 145.
Actual French practice has in fact moved away from the pure political test. See, e.g., Thomas E.
Carbonneau, The Political Offense Exception as Applied in French Cases Dealing with the
Extradition of Terrorists: The Quest for an Appropriate Doctrinal Analysis Revisited, in
TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 209 (MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEGAL STUD.
1983).
185. This test is sometimes referred to as the Swiss test. For an example of its use, see In re
Vogt, Fed. Ct. Switz., [1923-24] ANN. DIG. 285 (Case No. 165). See also FederalLaw on
Extradition to Foreign States, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 420, 423 (includes unofficial translation of In re

Vogt).
186. Under the proportionality part of the test, the more extreme the means used the stronger
the political justification must be. Thus in Ktir v. Ministere Public Federal, Fed. Tribunal Switz.,
34 I.L.R. 143, 145 (1961), Switzerland agreed to extradite an Algerian to France for murder even
though the accused clearly had a political motive, noting that for murder to qualify under the
political offense exception it must be "the sole means of attaining the political aim." Id.
187. This test is sometimes referred to as the Anglo-American test, and is based on a British
extradition case, In re Castioni, I Q.B. 149 (1891).
188. The incidence test was announced in In re Castioni, the first case in the UK addressing
the political offense exception. Id. Under the British interpretation of this definition an anarchist
was denied protection from extradition. Even though the act was clearly committed with a
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The U.S. courts have interpreted the incidence test to provide
protection for any act committed in connection with a political uprising
or disturbance.'89 In its most extreme form, the U.S. incidence test
defers to the political and strategic judgments of the political party,
concluding that an act or offense will qualify as political so long as a
political organization endorses it. 9 ' This definition "solves" the problem

of determining whether an act is inherently political by looking solely at
the existence or not of a broader uprising or disturbance. This approach
has been criticized as being both under- and over-inclusive. 9' The U.S.
approach is over-inclusive in that it applies to acts that otherwise would

be considered purely criminal but are labeled political solely because
their occurrence coincided with a political uprising. The most
controversial case of this nature involved the refusal to extradite a Nazi

war criminal because he killed civilians during a political conflict,
World War 11.192 The U.S. approach is under-inclusive in that it does not
apply to clearly political acts that do not arise out of or are not
accompanied by a larger political disturbance or conflict.
The policies underlying the political offense exception are
substantively similar to those underlying some amnesties. In fact, the
criteria used in South Africa to determine whether to grant amnesty are
based primarily on a survey of extradition law undertaken by the former
political motive, the British court reasoned that anarchists were against all governments and thus
were not trying to replace one government with another. See In re Meunier, 2 Q.B. 415 (1894). In
an exhaustive study of the political offense exception, Christine van den Wijngaert identifies the
"cleanest" articulation of the incidence approach in an opinion by Viscount Radcliffe in the
House of Lords: "In my opinion the idea that lies behind the phrase 'offense of a political
character' is that the fugitive is at odds with the State that applies for his extradition on some
issue connected with the political control or government of the country." Regina v. Governor of
Brixton Prison, ex parte Schtraks, 33 I.L.R. 319 (1967), quoted in VAN DEN WHNGAERT, supra
note 181, at 113.
189. See, e.g., Garcia-Guillem v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971) ("A
political offense.. .must involve an 'uprising' or some other violent political disturbance.").
190. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F. 2d 776, 810 (9th Cir. 1986) ("It is for the revolutionaries,
not the courts, to determine what tactics may help further their chances of bringing down or
changing the government. All that the courts should do is determine whether the conduct is
related to or connected with the insurgent activity.").
191. See Steven Lubet & Morris Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the
Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 203-04. (1980); VAN
DEN WJNGAERT, supra note 181, at 118-19.
192. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F. 2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated, 355 U.S. 393 (1958),
surrender denied on remand sub nom., U.S. v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). The
over-inclusiveness of the U.S. incidence is tempered by the fact that it does not apply to
"commonly criminal" crimes that have no political motive or character. As one court has said, the
political offense exception does not apply "to common crimes connected but tenuously to a
political disturbance, as distinguished from criminal acts 'causally or ideologically related to [an]
uprising."' Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 171-72 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Quinn v. Robinson,
783 F.2d 776, 809 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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President of the European Commission of Human Rights for the United
Nations.'93 For example, under the South African amnesty of 1995, an
applicant for amnesty must establish that he was a member of a
"publicly known" political organization and that he had authority from
that organization to commit the act for which he is seeking amnesty.'94
The South African parliament thus adopted a more objective definition
of "political" that focuses on the existence and authority of established

political organizations.
None of these definitions of the political offense exception directly
addresses the question of whether certain acts are so heinous that they
cannot qualify as a political offense.'95 An emerging international
consensus suggests, however, that there is a class of offenses to which

the political offense exception cannot apply regardless of the political
context. The few courts that have prosecuted individuals accused of
violations of international criminal law have suggested, sometimes quite

explicitly, that the acts for which the accused is charged are beyond the
scope of doctrines like the political offense exception. 9 6 The I.C.T.Y.
provides that states are to surrender197 an accused person to its
193. In fact the Norgaard Principles, developed by and named for Carl Aage Norgaard, were
developed to facilitate the release of political prisoners in Namibia during that country's transition
to independence.
194. The South African amnesty in fact does not speak of political acts, but of acts associated
with a political objective. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995
(South Africa) § 20(1)(b).
195. In fact the court in Artukovic suggests that as long as there is a political context, any act
may be considered a political offense no matter how heinous. 170 F. Supp. at 393. But see In re
Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1984):
[N]o act [should] be regarded as political where the nature of the act is such as to be
violative of international law, and inconsistent with international standards of civilized
conduct. Surely an act which would be properly punishable even in the context of a
declared war or in the heat of open military conflict cannot and should not receive
recognition under the political exception to the Treaty.
Id. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Were a civilian to detonate a
bomb in a peaceful marketplace or rake peaceful shoppers with a machine gun to make a political
point, this and most civilized countries would not consider such indiscriminate violence an
unpunishable political act.").
196. See, e.g., the statement of the Chambre d'accusation regarding the claim that it did not
have jurisdiction over Klaus Barbie since the latter had been kidnapped and brought to France for
trial:
[B]y reason of their nature, the crimes against humanity with which Klaus Barbie, who
claims German nationality, is charged in France where those crimes were committed,
do not simply fall within the scope of French municipal law but are subject to an
international criminal order to which notions of frontiers and extradition rules arising
therefrom are completely foreign.
Cass. Crim. [Criminal Chamber], Dec. 20, 1985, translatedin 78 I.L.R. 125, 130.
197. The Tribunals use the term "surr ender" rather than "extradite." See Committee on
Extradition and Human Rights, Third Report: February 1998, in REPORT OF THE 68TH
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jurisdiction regardless of "any legal impediment to the surrender or
transfer of the accused to the Tribunal which may exist under the
national law or extradition treaties of the [s]tate concerned."19' 8 Most
states have cooperated, passing legislation for the surrender of suspects
to the Tribunals that do not include provisions for double criminality,
political offenses, prescription, or other limitations that may be found in
an extradition treaty.'99 The provisions in the statute for the International
Criminal Court providing for surrender also do not include a political
offense exception.
Extradition law appears to suggest that we should look to the political
nature of the act for which amnesty is granted to determine whether the
amnesty is legitimate. The rejection within the U.S. of the Artukovic
rule that even a crime against humanity can qualify as a political offense
and thus be exempt from extradition, along with recent codifications of
international criminal law reflecting the same sentiment, suggest,
however, that certain heinous acts should not be eligible for amnesty
even if they would otherwise qualify as a political act.
E.

Proceduraland JurisdictionalBarriers to Accountability:
Immunities, Statutes of Limitation, and Laches

Amnesties are not the only legal mechanism for pausing or
extinguishing rights; rather, they are one of many such mechanisms
found in every recorded legal system. This is, at some level, not
surprising. All human institutions are governed by principles that are
subject to exceptions. We can distinguish between unprincipled
exceptions-ad hoc application of favoritism, for example-and
principled exceptions. The killing of an individual in self-defense is not
considered murder; that is, self-defense is a principled exception to the
general prohibition against killing. Needless to say, such principled
exceptions are not immune from controversy, nor are they always
accepted as legitimate. State-authorized killing-through armed conflict
or capital punishment, for example-is one such area where principled
exceptions are contested. Principled exceptions are found in
international human rights law as well. For example, some important
rights recognized under international law may be "derogated from" in
cases of extreme social stress.2"'
CONFERENCE 132, 150 (Int'l Law Ass'n ed., 1998) (noting that the tribunals avoid the term
"extradition" in order to distinguish its requests for suspects from ordinary extradition).
198. Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the I.C.T.Y. The I.C.T.R. has a
similar rule.
199. See Committee on Extradition and Human Rights, supra note 197, at 150.
200. See ICCPR, supra note 160, art. 4 (noting provisions from which derogation is not
permitted even in cases of national emergency).
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The challenge presented by amnesties is not whether principled rules
regarding justice and accountability may give way to principled
exceptions delaying or preventing accountability, but whether amnesties
are consistent with such exceptions, or are an illegitimate extension of
such exceptions.
While amnesties are the most contentious exception to individual
accountability, they are by no means the only such exception. Some of
these exceptions are not only uncontroversial, but also considered
central to a legitimate legal system (e.g., statutes of limitation and the
equitable doctrine of laches). Some are becoming more controversial,
particularly immunities provided to sovereigns, heads of state, and, to a
lesser extent, diplomats.
A more detailed discussion of amnesties within the context of these
other barriers to accountability may lead us to one of three conclusions.
First, amnesties are not significantly different than these other barriers,
and the legitimacy of the latter satisfies us as to the legitimacy of the
former. Second, amnesties are radically different than these other
barriers, and the legitimacy of the latter emphasizes the illegitimacy of
the former. Third, amnesties differ in degree, but not in kind, to these
other barriers, and the extreme nature of the former highlights the
fundamental illegitimacy of both. I will not attempt a discussion here
sufficient to do justice to these three possibilities. Instead, I briefly
explore the justifications of these other barriers to accountability and
test these justifications against the application of amnesties.
Impediments to legal accountability can be broken down into two
categories: 1) those that provide protection to certain individuals
because of the office they occupy (status immunities); and 2) those that
are central to the functioning of a fair and efficient judicial system
(prudential barriers).
The first category of barriers-immunity that attaches to particular
individuals because of the office they occupy-is based on the principle
of sovereignty. The principle that one state shall not sit in judgment
over the acts of another state is still a persistent characteristic of
sovereignty. Thus, states and their instrumentalities generally enjoy
immunity from legal process and accountability within the jurisdiction
of a foreign state.20 ' Separate from this general sovereign immunity, and
more relevant to the question of amnesties, is the more particular
201. See, e.g.,

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S. C. §§ 1603-1609

(generally

providing foreign state immunity from legal proceedings in the United States). State officials may
also enjoy immunity within their own municipal legal system. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681 (1997) (discussing immunity of U.S. president); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756
(1982) (same); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (discussing immunity ofjudges).
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immunity provided to a head of state. This head of state immunity is
historically based on the assumption that the head of state and sovereign
are one.202 Such immunity has been justified on a number of grounds,
including the nature and dignity of the office, comity, mutual respect
among nations, and the stability of international relations and
diplomacy.0 3
While the principle of sovereign immunity is still strong today, the
extent of the immunity has become increasingly contentious. The

application of sovereign protection to the person holding the position of
head of state-as opposed to the state itself-has contributed to this

controversy. The Allied Powers at Nuremberg and Tokyo asserted that
an individual responsible for certain crimes could be held accountable
for such crimes regardless of the official status of the person
responsible. While this assertion was clearly applied in cases of inferior
government and military officers, it was not applied to the relevant
heads of state. In the case of Germany, this was not a principled
decision concerning authority and immunity, but determined by Hitler's
suicide. The Japanese Emperor was not prosecuted at the Tokyo tribunal
because General McArthur concluded that the emperor was necessary to

ensure the rehabilitation of Japanese society. The first major human
rights convention drafted after World War II, the Genocide Convention,
explicitly does not provide immunity to a head of state.2°4 State courts in
the U.S. and U.K. have denied such immunity to former heads of

202. "Head of state immunity, like foreign sovereign immunity, is premised on the concept
that a state and its ruler are one for purposes of immunity." Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp.
128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
203. See, e.g., Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 132 (mentioning each of these justifications); The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137-38 (1812) (head of state immunity based on
the dignity of the office and nation, and on the common interest in mutual intercourse among
nations); In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (head of state immunity based on mutual
respect and comity).
The contours of head of state immunity are unclear, leading to scholarly discussion and
proposals to clarify the doctrine. See Ved P. Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign andIndividual
Immunities (Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity)
- Some Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467 (1999) (noting confused state of head of
state immunity); Shobha Varughese George, Head ofState Immunity in the United States Courts:
Still Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051 (1995) (proposing amendments
to the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to include head of state immunity); Peter Evan
Bass, Ex-Head of State Immunity: A Proposed Statutory Tool of Foreign Policy, 97 YALE L.J.
299 (1987) (noting lack of standards for applying head of state immunity and proposing statutory
standard); Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The Defined
Right of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (1986) (noting confusion over head of state immunity
and proposing amendment to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
204. Genocide Convention, supra note 28, at art. IV ("Persons committing genocide or any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.") (emphasis added).
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state, 215 and the prosecutor for the ad hoc international criminal tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia indicted a sitting head of state,2 °6 indicating

the prosecutor's belief that such immunity does not apply to a sitting
head of state accused of certain international criminal violations.

Finally, the recently drafted statute of the International Criminal Court
also removes the immunity traditionally afforded to a head of state.2"7
The International Court of Justice, however, seems to have missed this
trend in a recent decision reinforcing the traditional absolute immunities

that attach to a foreign state official. The I.C.J. held that a foreign
minister enjoys full immunity from criminal prosecution by the courts
of a foreign state while he holds that office, even for acts that constitute
an international criminal violation.0 8
The presence of sovereign and head of state immunity is compatible
with a strict prohibition against amnesties. These special immunities can
be justified as a limited exception to the general rule that certain crimes
should not go unpunished. Such an exception can be justified as
follows: if such immunity is not recognized, dictators and other human
rights violators will not peacefully give up power, thus increasing the
incidence of human rights violations. Yet, while the effect of holding
heads of state accountable may in the short run result in an increased
reluctance of some human rights abusers to give up power willfully, the
effect of not holding such leaders accountable creates an incentive for
human rights abusers to aspire to become head of state so as to be
immune from legal accountability for their worst acts. The justification
for such an immunity is thus open to serious question because, as an
205. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467(9th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126
(1995) (civil suit in U.S. against former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos); Paul v.
Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (civil suit in U.S. against former leader of Haiti, Prosper
Avril); Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999) (U.K. House of Lords decision concerning
extradition of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet to Spain for torture).
206. Indictment, Prosecutor v. Milosevic Case No. IT-99-37 (I.C.T.Y. May 22, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/I.C.T.Y./indictmentenglish/mil-ii990524e.htm (last visited Aug.
25, 2002).
207. I.C.C. statute, supra note 94, at art. 27(1) ("This Statute shall apply equally to all persons
without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of
State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.") (emphasis
added).
208. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), para.
54, available at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2002). The Court does note that its
decision is limited to those cases in which the courts of one state are attempting to hold the
official of another state accountable for violations of international criminal law, and not cases
involving the courts of the official's own state, nor cases involving an international tribunal. Id. at
61.
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empirical matter, it may serve to increase rather than diminish human
rights abuses." 9 The emerging trend illustrated by the international
criminal tribunals suggests that the important policies justifying state
immunities are giving way to those that support increased
accountability.
Arguments similar to those made with respect to state immunities are
made with respect to amnesties. Some argue that amnesties encourage,
and in some cases are crucial to, peaceful transitions ending human
rights violative regimes. Others argue that amnesties foster impunity
and encourage future human rights violations. The contentious nature of
head of state immunity and its growing disfavor suggests that the
policies underlying its creation do not provide an adequate justification
for the use of amnesties.
The second category of barriers to legal accountability is less
troubling than the first, and consists of statutes of limitation and the
equitable doctrine of laches. Statutes of limitation, which protect an
individual from liability if a sufficient period of time has passed, have
been justified on numerous grounds, including the importance of
"quieting title" or settling expectations, and minimizing distortion of
facts due to the passage of time.210 One early commentator delineated
the following additional justifications for criminal statutes of limitation:
(1) the deepseated desire to spare the innocent from the ordeal
and ignominy of prosecution and possibly conviction at a time
when the presentation of the facts is inevitably less than full, and
perhaps distorted; (2) a realization of the extreme inconvenience
and cost of impelling the accumulation of records over extended
periods of time; (3) the degree to which the secondary deterrence
factor decreases when a prosecution is instituted long after the
commission of an offense; (4) the reduced need for institutional
reformation of persons whose only provable crime occurred in
the distant past; and (5) the diminished public clamor for
retribution when an offender is not apprehended until long after
the crime.21'
209. I have developed this argument more fully in Ronald C. Slye, InternationalLaw, Human
Rights Beneficiaries, and South Africa: Some Thoughts on the Utility ofInternationalHuman
Rights Law, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 59 (2001).
210. See Note, Conspiracy, Concealment and the Statute of Limitations, 70 YALE L.J. 1311,

1334 (1961) (noting these two justifications for civil and criminal statutes of limitation); see also
WILLIAM D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVINGS STATUTES 7-47 (1978)

(concluding after detailed historical discussion that purposes of statues of limitations include the
protection of defendants against loss of witnesses and evidence, and defendant's acts taken in
reasonable reliance on plaintiff's inaction).
211. See Conspiracy, Concealment, and the Statute ofLimitations, supra note 210, at 1335.
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Amnesties are quite different from statutes of limitation. First,
amnesties generally take effect immediately after an offense has been

committed, rather than after a set period of time. 212 Thus, justifications
based upon stale evidence, protection of innocent defendants, cost of
record keeping, secondary deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution, do
not apply. 213 All of these justifications are premised on effects that are
assumed to occur with the passage of time. In fact, for crimes that

constitute gross violations of human rights there is ample anecdotal
evidence that the passage of time does not have the effect predicted by
these justifications. Certainly the public clamor for retribution appears
to be strong in cases involving violations that occurred as long as fifty
years ago, as the contemporary criminal and civil litigation surrounding
violations at the time of World War II demonstrates.
The equitable doctrine of laches is similar to the legal doctrine of

statutes of limitation. Both prevent a party from asserting his or her
rights after a sufficient amount of time has passed. Laches precludes the
assertion of an equitable right if the delay in asserting that right works a
disadvantage on another. 14 Statutes of limitation are concerned with the

fact of delay, while laches is concerned with the effect of delay. The
former is thus a bright line rule: if the limitations period has passed, the
right has extinguished regardless of the consequences. In practice,
however, laches only serves to extinguish a right earlier than the

comparable limitations period. Thus, laches effectively shortens a
limitations period if the general conditions that provide the rationale for
This list expands upon one of the few early official statements on the purposes of statutes of
limitation promulgated by the American Law Institutes. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 1956) § 1.07 (noting the following rationales for criminal statutes of limitation:
desirability of basing prosecution upon fresh evidence; likelihood that with passage of time
offender has reformed, diminishing need for criminal sanction; likelihood that with passage of
time the retributive impulse of the community has diminished; and "to lessen the possibility of
blackmail based on a threat to prosecute or disclose evidence to enforcement officials"). The
same reasoning is incorporated in the more recent MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 (1985).
212. But see Argentina's "Full Stop Law", Law No. 23492 (Dec. 23, 1986), reprinted in 3
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 505, providing an effective amnesty after an admittedly
short period of time.
213. This is exactly the argument the Supreme Court of Argentina made in striking down the
Argentinean Full Stop Law. The Full Stop Law provided a small window of opportunity in which
prosecutions for violations could be brought. The Argentinean court discussed the purposes and
policies underlying statutes of limitation to conclude that the Full Stop Law was effectively an
amnesty and not a statute of limitations. See Resoluci6n del Cavallo, supra note 16, at § v(A).
214. See HENRY L. M CCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY 71 (2d ed.
1948) ("Where a party has unreasonably delayed the assertion of an equitable claim until the
other party has acted, or the circumstances have changed... result[ing] in prejudice because of the
delay, equity will hold the party claiming the right to be guilty of laches, and will deny relief to
him.").
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statutes of limitation manifest themselves prior to the end of the
limitations period. In other words, if the justifications for the use of
statutes of limitation generally-such as stale evidence, fairness to
others, settled expectations-manifest themselves prior to the passage
of the limitations period, then the assertion of the rights are barred. The
doctrine of laches thus provides no additional justification that might
assist us in evaluating amnesties.
Amnesties in practice appear to accomplish the opposite of statutes of
limitation and laches. The latter provide a window of opportunity for
parties to assert their rights, and then foreclose those rights if they are
not timely asserted. Amnesties preclude the assertion of rights
immediately. While their intention is to forever preclude such an
assertion, in practice, many amnesties appear to only postpone the
assertion of rights. The Argentinean and Chilean amnesties, for
example, which in their immediate aftermath effectively foreclosed any
assertion of rights against their beneficiaries, have recently given way to
the assertion of such rights. Contrary to the policy rationales supporting
statutes of limitation and laches, the rationale supporting these
amnesties appears to be that the immediate assertion of rights may be
fraught with dangers, which recede with the passage of time. These
amnesties thus become the equivalent of reverse statutes of limitation;
that is, they delay the right to bring a claim until an appropriate period
of time has passed.
There is one last important point about statutes of limitation that is
relevant to the particular types of amnesties with which I am concerned.
Almost every jurisdiction that adopts statutes of limitation precludes
their application to the crime of murder. The early justification for this
exception was two-fold: acts of murder are assumed to present obstacles
to prompt discovery of evidence, and are assumed to have "long
' 21 5
continued impact on the sense of general security of the community.
Both of these phenomena exist in the case of gross violations of human
rights as well: evidentiary obstacles are high since the perpetrator is
often a government official with the power to cover up his crime and
thwart any attempt at an investigation. Further, the impact of such
violations on the general security of the community is high, especially
in the standard case involving state officials as perpetrators. In fact,
many states statutorily provide that no limitation applies to crimes
against humanity and war crimes, 21 6 reflecting a similar sentiment in
215. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956); see also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.06, cmt 2(a) (noting that murder, treason, and other crimes of comparable magnitude

often have no limitation period).
216. See, e.g., Law Concerning Responsibility for Genocide of the People of Lithuania, No.
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international law. 217 The international consensus to exempt such crimes
from any statute of limitations is great.2 18 At the drafting of the
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, only Greece publicly raised any
concern about such unlimited prosecutions.2 19
F.

Pardons

Pardons are similar to, yet quite distinct from, amnesties. Pardons are
issued after an individual has been found liable for a wrongful act.
In some cases, pardons are issued after an individual has begun to serve
a criminal sentence. Unlike amnesties, pardons are not ambiguous about
the guilt of the recipient. A pardon lifts or reduces the sentence or other
consequences attendant upon a finding of liability, but does not nullify
the finding of liability.220 Pardons thus remove punishment, but unlike
1-2477 (1992) (Lithuania), cited in United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, n.12 (2d. Cir. 1997);
Law No. 64-1326 , Appendix to the Penal Code (War) [C. Pen.] 1123 (85e ed. Dalloz 1987-88)
(French law), cited in Jean Olivier Viout, The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against Humanity,
3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 155, 157 n.16; German Penal Code, arts. 220 and 211, cited in
DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF OLD
CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND MORAL CONCERNS 57 (2000). See also
Strafrechtsanderungsgesetz [Criminal law amendment law], Osterreichisches Bundesgestzblatt 79
(1965) (Austria), cited in id. at 57 n.15.
217. See, e.g., Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73; European Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, opened
for signature Jan. 24, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540; see also InterAmerican Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons. For an example of a court holding
that statutory limitations do not apply to crimes against humanity and war crimes, see, for
example, Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistant et Patriotes and Others v.
Barbie, Cass. Crim [Criminal Chamber], Dec. 20, 1985, translatedin 78 I.L.R. 125.
218. In addition to individual state statutes, supra note 216, as of January 2001 forty-four
states have ratified the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, and two states have ratified the European Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes.
Jean-Bernard Marie, InternationalInstruments Relating to Human Rights, Classificationand
Status of Ratification as of I January2001, 22 HUM. RTS. L.J. 149-67 (ratifications of human
rights treaties as of January 1, 2001).
219. UN General Assembly, Third Committee, 1515th Meeting, Nov. 15, 1967, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR. 1515, 265, 17. In fact, in 1967 Greece declared that it was time to decree an amnesty
for crimes committed during World War II. Of course, this policy in support of amnesty and
against prosecutions was promulgated by the recently installed military dictatorship that was to
rule Greece until 1974. See 2 TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 241-42.
220. In the U.S., the historic writ of coram nobis (replaced today with Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b))
provides a mechanism by which a prior wrongful conviction is expunged. For an example of its
use as a form of corrective justice, see, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal.
1984); see also RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT (E. Yamamoto and M. Chon et al., eds. 2001). I am indebted to Margaret Chon for
bringing the writ of coram nobis to my attention.
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amnesties, do not disturb the accountability and truth functions of
justice. Yet they obviously raise many of the same issues as amnesties,
and are often (usually incorrectly) discussed interchangeably with
amnesties.
While pardons in general are not nearly as controversial today as
amnesties (although specific pardons can still generate a good deal of
controversy), this was not always the case. Kant, Bentham, and Hegel,
among others, were critical of the use of pardons by the monarchs and
leaders of their time.22 In fact, the legitimacy of pardons became more
problematic as nations moved from monarchies to democracies. The
logic of a kingly pardon was tied to the fiction that a criminal act was an
offense against the person of the king; thus, it was the king's
prerogative to decide whether to pardon an offense for which he was the
victim. In a democracy a criminal act is considered an offense against
"the people," and thus it is the people who have the authority to pardon.
Montesquieu and Blackstone felt strongly that while pardons in
principle might be defended, they had no place in a republic because a
pardon would negate the will of the people as reflected in the criminal
law. Of course the concerns of Montesquieu and Blackstone are more
easily satisfied in a representative democracy where an elected
executive exercises the pardon power and where a law authorizing a
pardon is drafted by an elected legislature. The idealism of Montesquieu
and Blackstone was put into practice with the French Revolution, which
along with the French monarchy, wiped out the power of pardon.
Significantly, this historic development lasted only a decade, and
appears to have been the only time in recorded history that a society was
governed without some form of clemency or pardon.222
Unlike amnesties, there is a developed and sophisticated literature
concerning pardons and their justification. There are four justifications
for pardons that are relevant to amnesties. Pardons are justified as: an
expression of the official grace and wisdom of a leader or government;
an expression of societal forgiveness for a transgression; a recognition
of rehabilitation; and as a contribution towards social stability. All of
these justifications are relevant to the question of amnesties and, except
for the rehabilitation justification, have been explicitly cited to support
the use of amnesties. The justification of amnesty as an expression of
the grace or wisdom of a leader is most prominent in the rhetoric
221. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
23-49 (Oxford 1989).
222. See id. at 24-25 (citing L. Sebba, Clemency in Perspective, in CRIMINOLOGY IN
PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ISRAEL DRAPKIN (Simha F. Landau & Leslie Sebba eds.,
1977).
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surrounding the annual "amnesties" issued by many Asian countries to
commemorate an important national event.223 The rhetoric surrounding
the more modem and sophisticated South African amnesty reflects the
justification of amnesty as a reflection of societal forgiveness.224 The
utilitarian justification of contributing to social stability is raised with
respect to amnesties issued in transitional contexts, from the amnesties
issued at the end of the U.S. Civil War 22522to
those issued more recently
226 Argentina, 2 7 and South Africa. 8
in Chile,
The rehabilitation justification for pardons highlights the significant
difference between pardons and amnesties. Pardons are issued after a
public trial and conviction, and in some cases, after all or a portion of an
incarceration sentence has been served. The pardoning authority thus
often has an opportunity to assess the rehabilitative progress of the
beneficiary over a substantial period of time. Such assessment is not
possible in the case of amnesties generally, except those that rise to the
level of accountable amnesties. The only amnesty that might qualify as
an accountable amnesty, the 1995 South African amnesty, by its terms
does not take into account rehabilitation.
Although pardons in general are not as controversial as amnesties,
and although they are generally compatible with the truth and
accountability provisions of justice, one need only look to certain
pardons issues by various U.S. presidents to realize that specific pardons
can be quite controversial. Upon closer examination, these controversial
pardons all entail some of the defining characteristics of amnesties.
President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon,229 President Bush's pardon
of Casper Weinberger,23 ° and President Clinton's pardon of Marc

223. In ancient and medieval China amnesties were promulgated upon the accession of a new
emperor as a signal of rebirth and renewal. See BRIAN McKNIGHT, THE QUALITY OF MERCY:
AMNESTIES AND TRADITIONAL CHINESE JUSTICE (1981). More recently Vietnam released close
to 2,000 prisoners and reduced the sentences of more than 4,000 others to celebrate the 54th
anniversary of its independence. BBC World News Online (Sept. 1, 1999) (on file with author).
224. See TUTU, supra note 45.
225. See generally, JONATHAN TRUMAN DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN

AND JOHNSON (1953).
226. See America's Watch, Human Rights and the 'PoliticsofAgreements': Chile During
PresidentAylwin's First Year, in 2 TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 17 at 500 (reprinting
Article 1 of the 1978 Chilean amnesty).
227. See supra note 212.
228. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (South Africa).
229. See Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (upholding President Ford's
pardon of former President Richard Nixon).
230. See The Pardons;Text of PresidentBush's Statement on the Pardon of Weinberger and
Others, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at A22.
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Rich, 3' were all controversial at the time, and all were issued prior to
any trial and conviction. There is, however, a significant difference
between these pardons and most amnesties. In each of these three
examples of presidential pardon, the individual wrongdoer was publicly
identified along with his crime, and each "case" was given substantial
public exposure. While the type of publicity generated by such pardons
is significantly different than that generated by an accountable
amnesty's official hearing (the quality of truth and the possibility of
acknowledgment being much greater in the former than in the latter),
the general acceptance of the one may provide some insight into the
legitimacy of the other.
While pardons appear to be the most closely analogous area of law to
amnesties, and thus a fruitful place for exploring the legitimacy of
amnesties, the significant difference between these two regarding truth
and accountability limits the applicability of the justifications for the
one to the other. While it is true that amnesties, like pardons, can play
an important role in reflecting important social values such as grace,
forgiveness, and even wisdom, the fact that most amnesties differ from
pardons in barring any form of truth and accountability weakens the
comparison.
What should we conclude from the discussion of these six general
principles of law? Each principle provides some insight into the
acceptability and legitimacy of amnesties. First, the discussion of the
law concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign official acts
leads us to conclude that the general reluctance to recognize foreign
penal acts fails to provide a justification for recognizing and enforcing a
foreign amnesty; and that the act of state doctrine and international
comity as interpreted by the U.S. courts also fail to provide strong
support for the argument that foreign amnesties should be recognized
and enforced.
Second, the discussion of the law concerning the recognition of
foreign judgments and the doctrine of non bis in idem leads us to
conclude that the application of the dual sovereignty exception to the
prohibition against double jeopardy would allow a domestic prosecution
despite a foreign amnesty; and that emerging principles of international
law concerning non bis in idem suggest that, excepting accountable
amnesties, amnesties should not be a bar to an international prosecution.
Third, the discussion of international refugee law leads us to
conclude that the non-recognition of an amnesty is less problematic than
the severe sanction that international refugee law allows in the case of
231. Michael Powell, Pardonswith a Precedent;Marc Rich Drama is Latest in a Long Line
ofLast Acts, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2001, at C1.
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individuals for whom there is "serious evidence" of involvement with
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Fourth, the discussion of the political offense exception in extradition
law leads us to conclude that while amnesties for acts that qualify as
political may generally be legitimate, certain heinous acts, such as those
that qualify as a crime against humanity, may not be a legitimate subject
of an amnesty even if they would otherwise qualify as a political act.
Fifth, the discussion of immunities, statutes of limitation and the
equitable doctrine of laches leads us to conclude that the evolving law
of official immunities, including head of state immunity, suggests that
such individuals should not be protected from accountability for certain
violations of international criminal law. That discussion also suggests
that the prudential concerns underlying statutes of limitation and laches
are not applicable to amnesties and, in fact, suggest that amnesties
might be illegitimate to the extent they preclude accountability
immediately after the commission of an offense. Finally, the policy
concerns underlying the general consensus that murder should not be
subject to any limitations, and the evidence of a similar sentiment
concerning the most serious war crimes and crimes against humanity
reflected in international treaties, suggest that amnesties should not
apply to violations of international criminal law.
Sixth, the discussion of pardons leads us to conclude that the
differences between pardons and amnesties in their effect on the truth
and accountability functions of justice make the policies underlying the
justification of the former less applicable to the latter.
IV.

CONCLUSION: IS A LEGITIMATE AMNESTY POSSIBLE?

Drawing upon the existing international law jurisprudence
concerning amnesties for gross violations of human rights and the six
general principles of law discussed above, one can identify the
following basic principles that should guide decisions concerning the
legitimacy of amnesties granted for gross violations of human rights.
They are accountability, truth, reparations, and participation. The survey
of general principles of analogous law illustrates that although
established legal doctrines appear to provide exceptions to these four
principles, none of these exceptions should apply to the special case of
amnesties for gross violations of human rights.
Both international law and the six general principles of law surveyed
suggest that some form of accountability is required for the most serious
international crimes. This is reflected in the sources cited to support the
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obligation to prosecute and punish, the rights of victims, the importance
of deterrence and social stability, the recognition of foreign official acts
and foreign judgments, the lack of protection afforded under
international refugee law to those responsible for serious international
crimes, the exceptions to the political offense doctrine in extradition
law, the emerging law of state immunities, the doctrine and policies
underlying statutes of limitation and laches, and the closely analogous
area of pardons.
The question thus arises as to whether an amnesty can meet the
minimum requirements of accountability, truth, reparations, and
participation derived from international law and the six analogous areas
of law discussed. To answer this question, we need to distinguish
among different types of amnesties. A survey of amnesties used
throughout history quickly demonstrates that amnesties vary
tremendously in their structure, purpose, and effect. This is true even for
amnesties created in the last few decades in response to gross violations
of human rights. Such amnesties can be divided into four main
categories: amnesic amnesties; compromise amnesties; corrective
amnesties; and accountable amnesties. To develop these categories I
looked at three general characteristics of amnesties. First I looked at the
substantive content of the amnesty (what acts are covered; who is
eligible; what if any procedural requirements are there; what type of
relief, if any, is given to victims; what type of burden, if any, is placed
on recipients). Second, I looked at the creation and implementation of
the amnesty (how close to the time of the violations is the amnesty
granted; is the amnesty combined with other programs to address the
needs of victims or the accountability of recipients; what is the political
context of the amnesty; was the amnesty democratically approved or
unilaterally decreed by its beneficiaries). Third, I looked at the purpose
of the amnesty (was it to facilitate a transition; to reveal information
about the past; to promote reconciliation; to diminish or end an armed
conflict).
1. Amnesic Amnesties. Amnesic amnesties typically are granted by a
regime that has been involved in human rights abuses. Examples of
amnesic amnesties are the 1978 Chilean amnesty,232 the 1986
Argentinean Full Stop Law,233 and the 1993 El Salvadoran amnesty.234
They tend to be blanket self-amnesties, although they may also be the
result of an agreement among all sides to a political and military
232. See supra note 226.
233. See Law No. 23492, supra note 212.
234. Decree No. 486, Mar. 20, 1993, reprinted in 3 TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 17,

at 546.
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conflict. Their defining characteristics are concealment and anonymity.
Beneficiaries are identified, if at all, through group characteristics rather
than individually. Amnesic amnesties provide little or no information
concerning past abuses.
Specifically, with respect to the first set of criteria, amnesic amnesties
have few if any act restrictions. They apply to their beneficiaries
regardless of their specific motive or objective and identify eligible
persons through group characteristics. Further, amnesic amnesties have
no procedural requirements, nor do they provide recipients with
immunity from both civil and criminal liability or place burdens on
recipients. Finally, amnesic amnesties provide no relief to victims, and
correspondingly impose burdens on victims.
With respect to the second set of criteria, amnesic amnesties may be
promulgated at any time, and are not combined with any other official
initiatives to address the consequences of the violations at issue.
Amnesic amnesties may be promulgated by any form of government,
and may have some support from a small minority of the public. Such
amnesties may be either self-dealing or arms length.
With respect to the third set of criteria, amnesic amnesties may be
designed to facilitate a social transition, but are not designed to further
inquiry or revelation. They are not a genuine expression of societal
grace or forgiveness. Further, amnesic amnesties may claim to further
reconciliation (although they rarely succeed), are not remedial, and may
be designed to diminish an armed conflict or civil unrest.
2. Compromise amnesties. Compromise amnesties are in the middle
of the continuum between amnesic and accountable amnesties. They are
compromises primarily because of their substantive terms, and not
because of how they were created. Both amnesic and compromise
amnesties may be the result of a political compromise in ending a
conflict or replacing a repressive regime.
Unlike amnesic amnesties, compromise amnesties partially conceal
and partially reveal. Revelation comes either through the amnesty itself
or through contemporaneous processes like a truth commission or legal
action. There is more acknowledgment than in the case of amnesic
amnesties, but unlike accountable amnesties the acknowledgment is
often institutional and not individual. Such amnesties are compromises
because they provide some benefit in the form of knowledge and
acknowledgment, but not enough to satisfy comfortably the minimum
requirements of justice.
A compromise amnesty is usually restricted in some way-restricted
in the acts to which it applies, to the people for whom it is applicable, or
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to the motives or objectives of eligible persons. A compromise amnesty
may apply only to a group of people defined by their status, to a class of
acts regardless of the status of the perpetrator, or to those individuals or
acts exhibiting a particular motive or objective. The existence of such
qualitative requirements means that compromise amnesties may result
in some form of truth or accountability. For example, take the family of
an individual who has disappeared. If the amnesty applies to all acts
committed by members of the military, family members may pursue an
investigation through some official government process until and unless
it is determined that the act was committed by a member of the military.
If the investigation reveals the involvement of non-military personnel,
then a legal remedy may be available. Even if the investigation reveals
military involvement and the investigation is immediately halted, the
identity of the person or organization responsible will have been
established, although legal accountability will be barred. This is in fact
the procedure of the Guatemalan and Honduran amnesties, where
judicial investigations are undertaken to determine whether the amnesty
applies.23 Amnesties that apply to classes of acts are less open to, but
not immune from, such investigatory manipulation. If the amnesty
applies to all acts of disappearances, for example, our family of a
disappeared individual will be unable to push for an official
investigation of the disappearance. On the other hand, if the family
knows who is responsible for the disappearance, they may attempt to
hold that individual accountable for a crime other than the
disappearance.236
An amnesty that only applies to a class of individuals or to a class of
acts may thus not qualify as an amnesic amnesty. There is a difference
in the type of compromised relief provided between an amnesty
restricted by the individuals to whom it applies, and one restricted by
the acts to which it applies. In the first, information or "truth" may be
revealed, as an investigation may proceed until it is determined whether
the responsible individual is a member of the protected class or not. In
the second, punishment may be imposed, as claims may be brought
against a responsible individual for acts not covered by the amnesty.
With respect to the first set of criteria, therefore, compromise
amnesties may have act restrictions, and may be restricted to acts
235. See Popkin, supra note 76 (Guatemalan amnesty); Recinos, supra note 76 (Honduran

amnesty).
236. This is the case in Argentina, where members of the past military regime have been
prosecuted for embezzlement and child kidnapping, two crimes that are not covered by the
amnesty. For example General Antonio Bussi was the object of a corruption investigation after
Judge Garzon in Spain discovered that he had three Swiss bank accounts. See Jack Epstein,
Legacies of Terror, HOUS. CHRON., May 10, 1998 at Al.
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committed with, or individuals inspired by, a particular motive or
objective. Further, they may identify eligible persons by group or
individual characteristics, and have procedural requirements. They may
also provide recipients with immunity from civil or criminal liability, or
both. Moreover, compromise amnesties may place some burdens on
recipients, provide minimal relief to victims, and may impose some
burdens on victims.
With respect to the second set of criteria, compromise amnesties may
be promulgated at any time. They are combined with other official
initiatives to address the consequences of the violations for which
amnesty is granted-such as a truth commission or reparations program.
Compromise amnesties may be promulgated by any form or branch of
government, but must have some support from the general public, and
may be either self-dealing or arms-length.
With respect to the third set of criteria, compromise amnesties are
designed to facilitate a social transition, and also to further inquiry or
revelation, either on their own or in combination with other government
initiatives. Compromise amnesties may be a genuine expression of
societal grace or forgiveness, and may further reconciliation. They may
also be partially remedial. 7 Finally, they may be designed to diminish
an armed conflict or civil unrest.
There are three fundamental differences between compromise and
amnesic amnesties. First, compromise amnesties are combined with
other official initiatives to address past violations; amnesic amnesties
are not. Second, compromise amnesties contribute, however minimally,
to inquiry or revelation; amnesic amnesties do not. Third, compromise
amnesties further reconciliation, while amnesic amnesties do not.
3. Corrective amnesties. Two general types of amnesties fall under
the category of corrective amnesties. One is correctly labeled an
amnesty as it is used to stay the enforcement or application of a law
that, while still considered legitimate, is no longer considered useful.
The other uses the institution of amnesty to accomplish something that
amnesties are not designed to do: reverse an injustice. The first type
usually occurs after a dramatic change in the social and political
environment; for example, the lifting of a state of emergency, or the end
of an internal or international armed conflict. Such amnesties apply to
acts of treason, sedition, rebellion, or other offenses against the state.

237. In other words, an amnesty that provides protection from both legitimate past laws and
for gross violations of human rights. Purely remedial amnesties are by definition legitimate, and
are what I call here corrective amnesties.
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The second type is not strictly an amnesty, but the reversal of an
injustice-an injustice created by an illegitimate law, or by mistaken or
fabricated facts. For example, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 grants
an amnesty to those unjustly removed from office under previous
regimes. 2 9 Amnesty International was founded on the idea that amnesty

should apply to such political crimes. 2' The UN expert Joinet criticizes
the use of amnesties to remedy injustice:

On strict grounds of principle, granting amnesty to a prisoner of
opinion is tantamount to an implicit acknowledgment that his
conduct was criminal, whereas it is really the authority
responsible for the penalty, being guilty of unlawful detention,
"'
[that] might be granted amnesty.24
The proper remedy for such an injustice is the reversing of a

judgment or retroactively repealing an illegitimate law. Amnesties are
poor substitutes; they fail to acknowledge that the law was either wrong
or wrongly applied, and thus are less effective in erasing the stigma of
wrongdoing that attaches to an individual accused of violation.242
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia passed laws after the fall of communism

granting "amnesty" to those convicted under laws that are no longer
considered legitimate, or who were targeted for prosecution because of
their political beliefs or activities.

3

238. See Protocol II, Art. 6(5), supra note 8; Commentary to Additional Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 at 1402 4618 (the purpose of amnesty "is to encourage gestures of
reconciliation which can contribute to reestablishing normal relations in the life of a nation which
has been divided"); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
239. BRAzIL CONST. [ CONSTUITI(AO FEDERAL], art. 8, reprinted in 3 TRANSNATIONAL
JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 670-71.
240. However, Amnesty International will not support amnesty for a prisoner of conscience
who advocates or has been involved in acts of violence against the state, a position that is
somewhat controversial among some of its supporters.
241. U.N. ESCOR, 38th Sess., Agenda Item 9(a) at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/16
(1985).
242. A UN report that looked at the legitimacy of amnesties and their use recommended that
amnesties not be used in cases involving prisoners of opinion since "this would signify
acknowledgment of the criminal nature of their actions, when in fact all they have done is to
exercise a legitimate right...." U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 10(a) at 35, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/sub.2/1993/6 (1993). Instead, proceedings against such individuals should be
discontinued and the individuals released immediately. Id.
243. Bulgaria's Law on Amnesty and Restoration of Confiscated Property grants amnesty for
acts that were unjustly criminalized under the communist regime. Law No. 167 (Dec. 20, 1990),
reprinted in 3 TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 797-805. Hungary's Law Voiding
Certain Convictions 1963-89 declared null and void certain convictions between April 5, 1963
and October 15, 1989 for conspiracy, insurrection, incitement, and offending the community. Law
No. 11 (Feb. 19, 1992), reprinted in 3 TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 797. Russia
passed an amnesty for those convicted of crimes against the state. Law on Rehabilitation of
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4. Accountable amnesties. Accountable amnesties are amnesties that
provide some accountability and more than minimal relief to victims.

To qualify as accountable, an amnesty must have the following
characteristics. First, it must be democratic in its creation. 2" Selfdealing amnesties, in which the legal authority of the amnesty derives
only from its beneficiaries, do not qualify as accountable amnesties. The
general involvement of the public and the involvement of more than one
branch of a democratic government in the drafting process arc two
important indicators of the democratic nature of an amnesty.245 Second,
it must not apply to those most responsible for war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and other serious violations of international criminal
law.246 Third, it m ust impose some form of public procedure or
accountability on its recipients. Thus amnesties that require a public
hearing in which the potential recipient is open to examination, or that
require that an amnesty recipient publicly acknowledge his or her
offense, would qualify as an accountable amnesty. Fourth, it must

provide an opportunity for victims to question and challenge an
individual's claim to amnesty. Such an opportunity could be, but need
not be, in a public forum. Fifth, it must provide some concrete benefit,
usually in the form of reparations, to victims. Such a benefit could come
either from the beneficiary or from the state. Sixth, and finally, it must
Victims of Political Repression, Oct. 18, 1991 (amended on Dec. 17, 1992), reprinted in 3
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 797-805.
244. Jose Zalaquett, a Chilean human rights lawyer who was a member of that country's
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, argues that to be legitimate an amnesty must be approved
in a way that expresses the will of the people. Majority approval is not sufficient; an accountable
amnesty must also take into account the desires of the victims, "the people who are going to live
with the consequences." Roht-Arriaza, supra note 95, at 202.
245. The Egyptian constitution institutionalizes a multi-branch requirement by providing that
an amnesty initially created by presidential decree is subject to subsequent ratification by
Parliament. See U.N. ESCOR, 38th Sess., Agenda Item 9(a) at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/1985/6
(1985).
246. By most responsible I mean those leaders, both political and military, who were the
effective architects and commanders of the atrocities at issue. They are, in Agnes Heller's words,
the "evil" people, as distinct from the merely "bad." Agnes Heller, The Natural Limits to Natural
Law and the Paradox of Evil, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds.,
1993). That is, the evil people are the ones at the top of the chain of command who created the
environment that facilitated the atrocities, and who had the power, but not the will, to stop them.
Id. The UN Security Council suggested that the proposed court for international crimes
committed in Sierra Leone focus only on those "who bear the greatest responsibility for the
commission of crimes." Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court
29 (Oct. 4, 2000). The Secretary General also indicated that
for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915,
amnesty should not apply to the "international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law." See S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug.
14, 2000), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 248 (2001) (resolution describing the Secretary General's
disclaimer to Lome Peace Accords regarding amnesty).
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be designed to facilitate a transition to a more human rights friendly
regime, or as part of a comprehensive program of reconciliation aimed
at addressing long-standing and serious societal tensions and injustices.
With respect to the first set of criteria, accountable amnesties must
not apply to those most responsible for serious war crimes, crimes
against humanity, or other serious violations of international criminal
law. Accountable amnesties may be restricted to acts committed with,
or individuals inspired by, a particular motive or objective. Accountable
amnesties apply to individuals and not groups, and have a formal
procedure for determining eligibility. Further, accountable amnesties
may provide recipients with immunity from civil or criminal liability, or
both. Moreover, this category of amnesties imposes burdens on
recipients, provides relief to victims, and imposes minimal burdens on
victims.
With respect to the second set of criteria, accountable amnesties may
be promulgated at any time and are combined with other official
initiatives to address the consequences of the violations for which
amnesty is granted-such as a truth commission or a reparations
program. Accountable amnesties are promulgated by a democratic
government, with public participation, and must be arm's length.
Finally, with respect to the third set of criteria, accountable amnesties
are designed to, and in fact do, facilitate a peaceful transition to a
human rights protective regime. Accountable amnesties further inquiry
and revelation, and reflect a genuine expression of societal grace or
forgiveness. Further, accountable amnesties substantially further
reconciliation, may be remedial, and may be designed to diminish an
armed conflict or pressing civil unrest.
The South African amnesty is the only one to date that comes close to
qualifying as an accountable amnesty. Unlike compromise amnesties,
accountable amnesties are not perceived as compromised justice, but
provide a form of justice that is as legitimate, and some argue more
legitimate, than accountability traditionally achieved through criminal
prosecutions or civil suits.247 While accountable amnesties do not
formally punish their recipients,248 they are more likely to provide an
admission and acknowledgment from a perpetrator than a traditional
trial. By offering an alternative to traditional trials as a mechanism for
justice, accountable amnesties are a possible institutional response to
growing calls for restorative-as distinct from retributive-justice.
It is of course no surprise that the amnesty I have labeled accountable
247. See Llewellyn and Howse, supra note 49; Llewellyn, supra note 52.
248. This does not mean that there is no personal cost to a recipient of an accountable
amnesty.
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amnesty is the one that holds the promise of a legitimate amnesty
eligible for recognition and respect by foreign states and international
tribunals. It is only slightly less surprising that there is only one amnesty
to date that even comes close to satisfying the requirements of an
accountable amnesty. The overwhelming majority of amnesties clearly
fall into the amnesic or compromise categories, with a smaller number
falling into the category of legitimate amnesties I have labeled
corrective. Even with the model of the South African amnesty firmly
established in the historical record, subsequent amnesties are still
designed to further impunity and amnesia.
With the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court
and the increased willingness to use transnational legal processes to
hold the worst human rights violators accountable for their crimes,
judgments concerning the legitimacy of an amnesty will become
increasingly important. The increased effectiveness of mechanisms for
holding individuals accountable for violations of international criminal
law may result in fewer amnesic amnesties and more accountable
amnesties, or may result in the abolition of amnesties as a common
response to violative pasts. Either would be preferred to the short-term
trend of the last few decades, where amnesic and compromise amnesties
have become the mechanism of choice for states in dealing with their
pasts. International law clearly places restrictions on the types of
amnesties that may be considered legitimate. The discussion of the six
analogous areas of law illustrates the uniqueness of amnesties, and the
illegitimacy of using such doctrines to justify amnesties for gross
violations of human rights.
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